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Incentives in Teams

文献名称	Incentives in Teams
文献作者	Theodore Groves
作者所在单位	University of California, San Diego
文献分类	已发表文献
学科一级分类	经济
学科二级分类	博弈论
文献摘要	This paper analyzes the problem of inducing the members of an organization to behave as if they formed a team. Considered is a conglomerate-type organization consisting of a set of semi-autonomous subunits that are coordinated by the organization's head. The head's incentive problem is to choose a set of employee compensation rules that will induce his subunit managers to communicate accurate information and take optimal decisions. The main result exhibits a particular set of compensation rules, an optimal incentive structure, that leads to team behavior. Particular attention is directed to the informational aspects of the problem. An extended example of a resource allocation model is discussed and the optimal incentive structure is interpreted in terms of prices charged by the head for resources allocated to the subunits.
参考文献
关键字	Incentives ，Teams
发表所在刊物（或来源）	Econometrica，Vol. 41, No. 4 (Jul., 1973), pp. 617-631
发表时间	1973-07-01
适用研究领域	激励理论，机制设计
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李gang	李gang发表于:2016-9-8 18:15 好文。
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