Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading |
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文献名称 | Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading | ||||||
文献作者 | Roger B. Myerson,Mark A. Satterthwaite | ||||||
作者所在单位 | Northwestern University,J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management | ||||||
文献分类 | 已发表文献 | ||||||
学科一级分类 | 经济 | ||||||
学科二级分类 | 博弈论 | ||||||
文献摘要 | We consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object. The seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables, and each individual's valuation is unknown to the other. We characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational, and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies. For a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade, and mechanisms that can maximize a broker's expected profit. | ||||||
参考文献 | |||||||
关键字 | Efficient mechanisms,bilateral trading | ||||||
发表所在刊物(或来源) | Journal of Economic Theory,Volume 29, Issue 2, April 1983, Pages 265-281 | ||||||
发表时间 | April 1983 | ||||||
适用研究领域 | |||||||
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上传时间 | 2011-1-21 16:45 | ||||||
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李gang |
李gang发表于:2016-9-8 18:11 很好,学习。 |
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