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Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading

文献名称 Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
文献作者 Roger B. Myerson,Mark A. Satterthwaite
作者所在单位 Northwestern University,J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management
文献分类 已发表文献
学科一级分类 经济
学科二级分类 博弈论
文献摘要 We consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object. The seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables, and each individual's valuation is unknown to the other. We characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational, and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies. For a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade, and mechanisms that can maximize a broker's expected profit.
参考文献
关键字 Efficient mechanisms,bilateral trading
发表所在刊物(或来源) Journal of Economic Theory,Volume 29, Issue 2, April 1983, Pages 265-281
发表时间 April 1983
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李gang
李gang发表于:2016-9-8 18:11
很好,学习。
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