经济Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production Versus Selection

Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production Versus Selection

文献名称	Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production Versus Selection
文献作者	Joseph P. Newhouse
作者所在单位	哈佛大学
文献分类	已发表文献
学科一级分类	经济
学科二级分类	卫生经济学
文献摘要	The tradeoff between an insurer's or medical provider's incentives to select good risks and to produce efficiently is governed by the supply-price analog to the demand-price tradeoff between moral hazard and risk aversion. Under a variety of models the optimum supply price is a mixture of capitation and fee-for-service payments. Empirical literature shows that pure capitation payment leaves strong incentives for selection that are acted upon. The presence of contracting costs in a Rothschild-Stiglitz model means a limited pooling equilibrium can exist and that poor risks will not be at their preferred outcome.
参考文献
关键字	incentives moral hazard risk aversion
发表所在刊物（或来源）	Journal of Economic Literature，Vol. 34, No. 3 (Sep., 1996), pp. 1236-1263
发表时间	Sep., 1996
适用研究领域
评论
上传时间	2011-2-21 15:26
下载文献	Newhouse96.pdf[648.05 KB] 注：下载文献会消耗您一个“当日剩余下载次数”
会员评论
发表评论

Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production Versus Selection