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1. Introduction
Part I. Static Games of Complete Information
2. Normal Form :
3. Nash Equilibrium
Part II. Dynamic Games of Complete Information
4. Perfect Information Games:
5. Repeated Games and Folk Theorems:
Part III. Static Games of Incomplete Information
Part IV. Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
6. Sequential Rationality
Part V. Information Economics
7. Akerlof 's Lemon Model
8. Job Market Signalling
9. Moral Hazard
Part VI. Mechanism Design
10. Introduction :
11. Adverse selection: Mechanism Design with One Agent
12. Mechanism Design Problem with Many Agents
13. Dominant Strategy Equilibrium
14. Bayesian Equilibrium
15. Effciency
16. Social Choice
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