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Kahneman, Daniel and A. Tversky,1979, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk", Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 2, 263-292.
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Iyigun, Murat and Randall P. Walsh£¬2007,"Endogenous gender power: household labor supply and the demographic transition",Journal of Development Economics, pp.138-55.
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