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[财经英语角区] How to stave off a second Great Depression----By George Soros [推广有奖]

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    Financial markets are driving the world towards another Great Depression. The authorities, particularly in Europe, have lost control of the situation. They need to regain control and they need to do so now.

    Three bold steps are needed. First, the governments of the eurozone must agree in principle on a new treaty creating a common Treasury for the eurozone. In the meantime, the main banks must be put under   European Central Bank direction in return for a temporary guarantee and permanent recapitalisation. The ECB would direct banks to maintain credit lines and outstanding loans, while closely monitoring risks taken for their own accounts. Third, the ECB would enable countries such as Italy and Spain to temporarily refinance themselves within limits at a very low cost. This would calm markets and give Europe time to develop a growth strategy, without which the debt problem cannot be solved.
    This is how it would work. Since a eurozone treaty establishing a common Treasury would take a long time to conclude, in the interim the member states have to appeal to the ECB to fill the vacuum. The European financial stabilisation facility (EFSF) is still being formed but in its present form the new common Treasury is only a source of funds. How the funds are spent is left to the member states. It would require a new intergovernmental agency to enable the EFSF to co-operate with Europe’s central bank. This would have to be authorised by the Bundestag and perhaps other legislatures.
    The immediate task is to erect safeguards against contagion from a possible Greek default. Both the banks and bonds of countries such as Italy and Spain need to be protected. These two tasks could be accomplished as follows.
    The EFSF would be used primarily to guarantee and recapitalise banks. Systemically important banks would have to sign an undertaking with the EFSF to abide by the instructions of the ECB as long as the guarantees were in force. Banks that refused would not be guaranteed. The ECB would then instruct the banks to maintain credit lines and loan portfolios while monitoring risks in their accounts. These arrangements would stop the concentrated deleveraging that is one of the main causes of the crisis. Completing the recapitalisation would remove the incentive to deleverage.
    To relieve the pressure on the government bonds of countries such as Italy, the ECB would lower its discount rate. It would then encourage countries to finance entirely by issuing Treasury bills, and banks to buy the bills. Banks could rediscount the bills with the ECB but they would not do so as long as they earned more on the bills than on the cash. This would allow Italy and other countries to refinance for about 1 per cent a year during this emergency period. Yet the countries concerned would be subject to strict discipline because if they went beyond agreed limits the facility would be withdrawn. Neither the ECB nor the EFSF would buy any more bonds in the market.
    These measures would allow Greece to default without causing a global meltdown. That does not mean Greece would be forced into default. If it met targets, the EFSF could underwrite a “voluntary” restructuring at, say 50 cents on the euro. The EFSF would have enough money to guarantee and recapitalise the European banks. It would be left to the IMF to recapitalise Greek banks. How Greece fared would be up to the Greeks.
    These steps would end the acute phase of the crisis by staunching its two main sources and reassuring markets that a longer-term solution was in sight. Thatwould be more complicated because the regime imposed by the ECB would leave no room for fiscal stimulus and the debt problem could not be resolved without growth.
    Many other proposals are under discussion behind closed doors. Most seek to leverage the EFSF by turning it into a bank or an insurance company or by using a special purpose vehicle. While practically any proposal is liable to bring temporary relief, disappointment could push markets over the brink. Markets are likely to see through inadequate proposals, especially if they violate Article 123 of the Lisbon treaty, which my proposal respects. That said, some form of leverage could be useful in recapitalising the banks.
    This action does not require leveraging or increasing the size of the EFSF but it is more radical because it puts the banks under European control. That is liable to arouse the opposition of the banks and the national authorities. Only public pressure can make it happen.
    The writer is chairman of Soros Fund Management
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如何避免第二次大萧条
By George Soros
作者:乔治·索罗斯

Financial markets are driving the world towards another Great Depression. The authorities, particularly in Europe, have lost control of the situation. They need to regain control and they need to do so now.
金融市场正在推动世界走向另一个大萧条。管理当局,特别是欧洲的管理者,已经失去了对局势的掌控。他们需要重新获得控制权,而且立刻就做。

Three bold steps are needed. First, the governments of the eurozone must agree in principle on a new treaty creating a common Treasury for the eurozone. In the meantime, the main banks must be put under European Central Bank direction in return for a temporary guarantee and permanent recapitalisation. The ECB would direct banks to maintain credit lines and outstanding loans, while closely monitoring risks taken for their own accounts. Third, the ECB would enable countries such as Italy and Spain to temporarily refinance themselves within limits at a very low cost. These steps would calm markets and give Europe time to develop a growth strategy, without which the debt problem cannot be solved.
有三个大胆的步骤必须做。首先,欧元区各国ZF必须在原则上同意创建一个欧元区共同的财政部。同时,必须把主要银行交给欧洲央行(ECB),接受它的指令,以此取得一个临时的担保和永久的资本重组。欧洲央行(ECB)将指导银行如何维持信贷额度和管理未到期贷款,而同时自己密切监视自己帐户的风险。第三,欧洲央行应让如意大利和西班牙等国家,暂时性地在一个范围内以非常低的的成本再融资。这些步骤可以平复市场情绪,并留给欧洲一定的时间来制定增长性的策略。否则,债务问题就得不到解决。


This is how it would work. Since a eurozone treaty establishing a common Treasury would take a long time to conclude, in the interim the member states have to appeal to the ECB to fill the vacuum. The European financial stabilisation facility (EFSF) is still being formed but in its present form the new common Treasury is only a source of funds and how the funds are spent is left to the member states. It would require a new intergovernmental agency to enable the EFSF to co-operate with Europe’s central bank. This would have to be authorised by the Bundestag and perhaps other legislatures as well.
运作原理是这样的:由于在欧元区定协议建立一个共同的财政部会需要相当长的时间,在此期间,各成员国必须求诸欧洲央行,让它来填补这个真空。欧洲金融稳定基金(EFSF)仍然让它建立,但就目前的形式而言,新的共同的财政部只是一个提供资金的来源,至于资金如何花费,取决于成员国。而新的方法将由一个新的ZF间机构与欧洲央行合作,让EFSF运作。共同财政部必须得到德国联邦议院和可能其他一些立法机关的授权。

The immediate task is to erect safeguards against contagion from a possible Greek default. There are two vulnerable groups – the banks and the bonds of countries such as Italy and Spain – that need to be protected. These two tasks could be accomplished as follows.
当务之急是,形成保障机制,一旦希腊违约,要防止危机蔓延。有两类较为脆弱的群体需要保护 - 诸如意大利和西班牙等国家的银行和债券。而这两项任务可以这样做:

The EFSF would be used primarily to guarantee and recapitalise banks. Systemically important banks would have to sign an undertaking with the EFSF to abide by the instructions of the ECB as long as the guarantees were in force. Banks that refused would not be guaranteed. Europe’s central bank would then instruct the banks to maintain credit lines and loan portfolios while closely monitoring risks in their own accounts. These arrangements would stop the concentrated deleveraging that is one of the main causes of the crisis. Completing the recapitalisation would remove the incentive to deleverage.
欧洲金融稳定基金(EFSF)将主要用于担保和为银行进行资本重组。对系统来说极其重要的银行必须同EFSF签署协议,在被担保期间,必须遵守欧洲央行的指令。如不签这个协议,则不给予担保。然后欧洲央行指导银行如何维持信贷额度和贷款组合,而同时自己密切注意自己帐户的风险。这些措施可以避免去杠杆化过于集中,而后者正是此次危机的主要根源之一。而完成资本重组也将使银行不再急着去杠杆化。

To relieve the pressure on the government bonds of countries such as Italy, the ECB would lower its discount rate. It would then encourage countries to finance entirely by issuing Treasury bills, and banks to buy the bills. Banks could rediscount the bills with the ECB but they would not do so as long as they earned more on the bills than on the cash. This would allow Italy and other countries to refinance for about 1 per cent a year during this emergency period. Yet the countries concerned would be subject to strict discipline because if they went beyond agreed limits the facility would be withdrawn. Neither the ECB nor the EFSF would buy any more bonds in the market.
为了缓解诸如意大利等国家的ZF债券的压力,欧洲央行应降低贴现率。这将鼓励各国发行短期国债、银行购买国债,以此来自行融资。银行虽然可以将这些短期国债再次打折,卖给欧洲央行,但是只要他们的短期国债收益高于现金,他们是不会这样做的。这种方法,可以让意大利以及其他国家这次危机中,每年再融资1%左右。但是同时应该对这些问题国家进行严格的纪律约束,如果他们发债超过限度,贷款额度将被欧洲央行收回。欧洲央行和欧洲金融稳定基金(EFSF)都不可以从市场上买入这些国家发行的这类债券。

These measures would allow Greece to default without causing a global meltdown. That does not mean that Greece would be forced into default. If it met targets, the EFSF could underwrite a “voluntary” restructuring at, say 50 cents on the euro. The EFSF would have enough money left to guarantee and recapitalise the European banks. It would be left to the International Monetary Fund to recapitalise the Greek banks. How Greece fared then would be up to the Greeks.
这些措施会使得即使希腊违约,也不会造成全球性的大衰退。不过这并不意味着希腊将被迫违约。如果它满足了原定目标,EFSF可以承保一个“自愿性”的债券重组,比如说将债务扣减为面值的50%。 这样EFSF将有足够的钱用于担保和让欧洲银行资本重组。而希腊银行就留给国际货币基金组织来进行资本重组。至于希腊如何表现,将取决于希腊人自己。

These steps would bring the acute phase of the crisis to an end by staunching its two main sources and reassuring markets that a longer-term solution was in sight. That solution would be more complicated because the regime imposed by the ECB would leave no room for fiscal stimulus and the debt problem could not be resolved without growth. How to create viable fiscal rules for the euro would be left to negotiations.
这些措施通过止住危机的两大源头、给市场赋予信心,让其看到存在一个长期的解决方案,可以让急性的危险期暂告段落。长期的解决方案要复杂得多,因为受欧洲央行的管辖后,进行财政刺激措施就没有空间,而且如果经济不增长,也不能解决债务问题。而如何在欧洲创建一个可行的财政制度,需要继续磋商。

Many other proposals are under discussion behind closed doors. Most seek to leverage the EFSF by turning it into a bank or an insurance company or by using a special purpose vehicle. While practically any proposal is liable to bring temporary relief, disappointment could push financial markets over the brink. Markets are likely to see through inadequate proposals, especially if they violate Article 123 of the Lisbon treaty, which my proposal respects. That said, some form of leverage could be useful in recapitalising the banks.
也有其他的许多建议正在闭门讨论。大多数是想增加EFSF的杠杆,把它变成一个银行或保险公司或一个特殊目的的公司(SPV)。虽然几乎所有的方案都想给市场带来暂时的缓解,但是如果造成失望,这会把金融市场逼入绝境。尤其,如果任何方案违反了里斯本条约第123款(我的方案在此尊重该条款),市场见到可能就是一个不够好的建议。但话又说回来,某些形式的杠杆化可以有助于银行的资本重组。

(译注:里斯本条约第123款是说欧洲央行不能偏袒某一国、地区、机构等等,给予超额信贷额度。)

This course of action does not require leveraging or increasing the size of the EFSF but it is more radical because it puts the banks under European control. That is liable to arouse the opposition of both the banks and the national authorities. Only public pressure can make it happen.
我所建议的行动并不需要加大杠杆或增加EFSF的规模,但它是更激进的方法,因为它把银行置于整个欧洲的控制之下。这很容易引起银行和各国当局的反对。而只有公众的压力,才能让这种方案实现。

The writer is chairman of Soros Fund Management

(本文作者是索罗斯基金管理公司的董事长)
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