经济Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence From a Firm-Level Experiment*

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Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence From a Firm-Level Experiment*

文献名称	Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence From a Firm-Level Experiment*
文献作者	Oriana Bandiera Iwan Barankay Imran Rasul
作者所在单位	London School of Economics and Political Science,University of Essex,University College London
文献分类	已发表文献
学科一级分类	经济
学科二级分类	行为与实验经济学
文献摘要	We present evidence from a firm level experiment in which we engineered an exogenous change in managerial compensation from fixed wages to performance pay based on the average productivity of lower-tier workers. Theory suggests that managerial incentives affect both the mean and dispersion of workers' productivity through two channels. First, managers respond to incentives by targeting their efforts towards more able workers, implying that both the mean and the dispersion increase. Second, managers select out the least able workers, implying that the mean increases but the dispersion may decrease. In our field experiment we find that the introduction of managerial performance pay raises both the mean and dispersion of worker productivity. Analysis of individual level productivity data shows that managers target their effort towards high ability workers, and the least able workers are less likely to be selected into employment. These results highlight the interplay between the provision of managerial incentives and earnings inequality among lower-tier workers.
参考文献
关键字	Incentives ,Experimen
发表所在刊物（或来源）	Quarterly Journal of Economics,May 2007, Vol. 122, No. 2, Pages 729-773
发表时间	May 2007
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