Chinese indices are inexpensive, but imbalance is a concern
In the second note of our deep dive series, we explore investor FAQs: Why
do banks make up so much of index earnings? Do banks’ low valuations
explain the recent MXCN overall de-rating, and will it prevent a re-rating?
Q1: Why do banks make up such a large % of index EPS?
Banks comprise around 40-50% of MXCN/CSI300 earnings, high vs other
major markets and thus a source of investor worries. But, a deeper analysis
shows that banks earnings as a % of total China enterprise profits are around
19%, a much less concerning level. We think disproportionately high banks
earnings contribution is due more to disproportionately high % of its earnings
listed (80% of banks earnings are listed vs 30% for secondary industries),
rather than from regulation driving artificially inflated banks’ profits. Nearterm,
market concerns over banks’ earnings risks (mainly relating to NPL) are
understandable and may keep the sector valuation low. Over time, other
sectors’ faster earnings growth / fewer banks’ IPOs will likely gradually lead to
a more balanced MXCN earnings mix.
Q2: Are banks the main reason China is inexpensive?
The banking sector’s de-rating and large weighting do not appear to be the
only reasons for China’s low valuation. MXCN ex banks (and ex banks,
property, commodities) have also de-rated by about 3 P/E points in 2011
(vs 3.5 P/E points de-rating for MXCN; and 1.5 P/E points for DM markets).
Q3: If banks remain inexpensive, can China re-rate?
We think the market will unlikely re-rate back to historical mean levels as
structural concerns may take time to resolve. But, we think some degree of
valuation improvement is achievable for the index as cyclical pressures
ease. We target 9.5X MXCN fPER by end-2012E, from 8.5X at end-2011.
目录
Contents
Inexpensive due to imbalance? 2
Question 1: Why do banks make up such a large % of index earnings? 3
Question 2: Are banks the key reason why China is inexpensive? 14
Question 3: If banks remain inexpensive, can China re-rate? 18
Disclosure Appendix 23