理论模型+数值模拟的案例：
Screening as a Uni ed Theory of Delinquency,
Renegotiation, and Bankruptcy
Natalia Kovrijnykhy and Igor Liv*****sz
May 2013
Abstract
We propose a parsimonious model with adverse selection where delinquency, rene-
gotiation, and bankruptcy all occur in equilibrium as a result of a simple screening
mechanism. A borrower has private information about her cost of bankruptcy, and a
lender may use random contracts to screen di erent types of borrowers. In equilib-
rium, some borrowers choose not to repay, and thus become delinquent. The lender
renegotiates with some delinquent borrowers. In the absence of renegotiation, delin-
quency leads to bankruptcy. Presence of competition may induce the incumbent
lender to renegotiate even when he would not do so in the monopoly setting. We ap-
ply the model to analyze e ects of a government intervention in debt restructuring.
We show that a mortgage modi cation program aimed at limiting foreclosures that
fails to take into account private debt restructuring may have the opposite e ect from
the one intended.
Keywords: Default, Delinquency, Bankruptcy, Renegotiation, Adverse Selection,
Screening, Consumer Credit