Screening as a Unified Theory of Delinquency Renegotiation, and Bankruptcy

相似文件 换一批

是 否 +2 论坛币

k人 参与回答

经管之家送您一份

应届毕业生专属福利!

求职就业群

赵安豆老师微信：zhaoandou666

经管之家联合CDA

送您一个全额奖学金名额~ !

立即领取

感谢您参与论坛问题回答

经管之家送您两个论坛币！

+2 论坛币

Screening as a Unified Theory of Delinquency Renegotiation, and Bankruptcy.pdf (440.81 KB)

2013-8-24 08:23:57 上传

阅读权限: 26

理论模型+数值模拟的案例：
Screening as a Uni ed Theory of Delinquency,
Renegotiation, and Bankruptcy
Natalia Kovrijnykhy and Igor Liv*****sz
May 2013
Abstract
We propose a parsimonious model with adverse selection where delinquency, rene-
gotiation, and bankruptcy all occur in equilibrium as a result of a simple screening
mechanism. A borrower has private information about her cost of bankruptcy, and a
lender may use random contracts to screen di erent types of borrowers. In equilib-
rium, some borrowers choose not to repay, and thus become delinquent. The lender
renegotiates with some delinquent borrowers. In the absence of renegotiation, delin-
quency leads to bankruptcy. Presence of competition may induce the incumbent
lender to renegotiate even when he would not do so in the monopoly setting. We ap-
ply the model to analyze e ects of a government intervention in debt restructuring.
We show that a mortgage modi cation program aimed at limiting foreclosures that
fails to take into account private debt restructuring may have the opposite e ect from
the one intended.
Keywords: Default, Delinquency, Bankruptcy, Renegotiation, Adverse Selection,
Screening, Consumer Credit

扫码加我 拉你入群

请注明：姓名-公司-职位

以便审核进群资格，未注明则拒绝

分享0 收藏0 回帖

关键词：Negotiation Bankruptcy screening Unified Theory 模型 private simple result screen