乱七八糟的英文论文一大堆，有空就传点，顺便赚点分，下载，嘿嘿。
另外，有人特别需要哪方面的，可以短消息给我，说不定我有，不过别抱
多大希望，只能瞎猫碰死老鼠了。

一、German labor market and fiscal reforms 1999 to 2008: Can they be blamed for intra-Euro Area imbalances?

In this paper,we assess the impact ofmajor German structural reforms from1999 to 2008 on key macroeconomic variables within a two-country monetary union DSGE model. Bymany, these reforms, especially the Hartz reforms on the labormarket, are considered to be the root of thereafter observed imbalances in the Euro Area. We find that, in terms of German GDP, consumption, investment and (un)employment, the reforms were a clear success albeit the impact on the German trade balance and the current account was onlyminor. Most importantly, the rest of the Euro Area benefited frompositive spillover effects. Hence, our analysis suggests that the reforms cannot be held responsible for the currently observed macroeconomic imbalances within the Euro Area.
Keywords: Fiscal Policy,Labor Market Reforms,DSGE modeling,Macroeconomics



1.1，The Economic Impact of Civil Justice Reforms
Date: 2014-09
By: Dimitri Lorenzani
Federico Lucidi

Quality, independence and efficiency are the key components of effective justice systems, a crucial condition to ensure the proper functioning of important drivers of growth in the EU. This paper focuses on judicial efficiency and investigates the impact of certain structural reforms affecting the civil justice system on selected economic outcomes, such as business dynamics and foreign direct investments (FDI). In doing so, the role of efficiency of justice systems (measured by disposition time and the ratio of pending cases to population, both referred to litigious civil and commercial disputes) is highlighted as a transmission channel linking judicial reforms to economic variables. The work draws upon a dataset based on the reports by the Council of Europe's European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ). The results support the growth potential of judicial reforms rationalising the organisation of courts, fostering investment in in-court ICT and introducing incentives to reduce excessive litigation rates (for instance by enhancing the use of alternative disputes resolution methods), which are all found to positively affect the efficiency of civil justice. By increasing the efficiency of the justice system, these reforms can enhance entrepreneurial activity (as measured by firms' entry rates) and FDI.



1.2 Future Directions for the Irish Economy. Conference Proceedings

Graham Stull

Future Directions for the Irish Economy. Conference Proceedingspdf(2 MB) Choose translations of the previous link

Ireland's successful conclusion of the financial assistance programme provides an important opportunity to assess the prospects of the Irish economy to achieve good growth, to prevent future banking crises and to lock in budgetary and fiscal improvements that were achieved over the course of the Programme. It is also a natural opportunity to assess the adjustment undertaken under the programme, with a view to identifying lessons learned that can contribute to the academic debate, or that can serve as policy guidance for other countries facing similar economic challenges.



Merger Performance and Managerial Incentives
By: Matthias Kräkel and Daniel Müller

We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low synergies—even when targets with high synergies are available—to obtain high-powered incentives and, hence, a high personal income at the merger-management stage.
Keywords: acquisition; merger; moral hazard



On the Equivalence between Iterated Application of Choice Rules and Common Belief of Applying these Rules
Date: 2014-11-25
By: Michael Trost (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena)

One central issue tackled in epistemic game theory is whether for a general class of strategic games the solution generated by iterated application of a choice rule gives exactly the strategy profiles that might be realized by players who follow this choice rule and commonly believe they follow this rule. For example, Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) and Tan and Werlang (1988) have established that this coincidence holds for the choice rule of strict undominance in mixtures in the class of finite strategic games, and Mariotti (2003) has established that this coincidence holds for Bernheim's (1984) choice rule of point rationality in the class of strategic games in which the strategy sets are compact Hausdorff and the payoff functions are continuous. In this paper, we aim at studying this coincidence in a general way. We seek to figure out general conditions of the choice rules ensuring it for a general class of strategic games. We state four substantial assumptions on choice rules. If the players' choices rules satisfy - besides the technical assumption of regularity - the properties of reflexivity, monotonicity, Aizerman's property, and the independence of payoff equivalent conditions, then this coincidence applies. This result proves to be strict in the following sense. None of the four substantial properties can be omitted without eliminating the coincidence.
Keywords: Iterative deletion procedure, common belief, choice rule, epistemic game theory

On the Equivalence between Iterated Application of Choice Rules and Common Belief of Applying these Rules
Date: 2014-11-25
By: Michael Trost (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena)

One central issue tackled in epistemic game theory is whether for a general class of strategic games the solution generated by iterated application of a choice rule gives exactly the strategy profiles that might be realized by players who follow this choice rule and commonly believe they follow this rule. For example, Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) and Tan and Werlang (1988) have established that this coincidence holds for the choice rule of strict undominance in mixtures in the class of finite strategic games, and Mariotti (2003) has established that this coincidence holds for Bernheim's (1984) choice rule of point rationality in the class of strategic games in which the strategy sets are compact Hausdorff and the payoff functions are continuous. In this paper, we aim at studying this coincidence in a general way. We seek to figure out general conditions of the choice rules ensuring it for a general class of strategic games. We state four substantial assumptions on choice rules. If the players' choices rules satisfy - besides the technical assumption of regularity - the properties of reflexivity, monotonicity, Aizerman's property, and the independence of payoff equivalent conditions, then this coincidence applies. This result proves to be strict in the following sense. None of the four substantial properties can be omitted without eliminating the coincidence.
Keywords: Iterative deletion procedure, common belief, choice rule, epistemic game theory