<p>1</p>文献名： Perfect Public Equilibria when Players are Patient <p></p><p>作者：Fudenberg, D., D. Levine, and S. Takahashi</p><p>期刊：Games and Economic Behavio r</p><p>卷号及页码：2007, 61. 27-49.</p><p>电子链接：<a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&amp;_udi=B6WFW-4N1SJVG-1&amp;_user=4991442&amp;_coverDate=10%2F31%2F2007&amp;_alid=793394367&amp;_rdoc=2&amp;_fmt=high&amp;_orig=search&amp;_cdi=6805&amp;_sort=d&amp;_docanchor=&amp;view=c&amp;_ct=2&amp;_acct=C000050221&amp;_version=1&amp;_urlVersion=0&amp;_userid=4991442&amp;md5=aded1212adbf53fed2876d4a00e03953">http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&amp;_udi=B6WFW-4N1SJVG-1&amp;_user=4991442&amp;_coverDate=10%2F31%2F2007&amp;_alid=793394367&amp;_rdoc=2&amp;_fmt=high&amp;_orig=search&amp;_cdi=6805&amp;_sort=d&amp;_docanchor=&amp;view=c&amp;_ct=2&amp;_acct=C000050221&amp;_version=1&amp;_urlVersion=0&amp;_userid=4991442&amp;md5=aded1212adbf53fed2876d4a00e03953</a></p><p></p><p>2</p>文献名： Continuous Time Limits of Discrete Time Games <p></p><p>作者：Fudenberg, D. and D. Levine</p><p>期刊：Review of Economic Dynamics</p><p>卷号及页码：Volume 10, Issue 2, April 2007, Pages 173-192</p><p>电子链接：<a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&amp;_udi=B6WWT-4NC5T73-1&amp;_user=10&amp;_coverDate=04%2F30%2F2007&amp;_rdoc=2&amp;_fmt=high&amp;_orig=browse&amp;_srch=doc-info(%23toc%237139%232007%23999899997%23647656%23FLP%23display%23Volume)&amp;_cdi=7139&amp;_sort=d&amp;_docanchor=&amp;_ct=8&amp;_acct=C000050221&amp;_version=1&amp;_urlVersion=0&amp;_userid=10&amp;md5=8b3de551d14ea892b2e1bc034a664647">http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&amp;_udi=B6WWT-4NC5T73-1&amp;_user=10&amp;_coverDate=04%2F30%2F2007&amp;_rdoc=2&amp;_fmt=high&amp;_orig=browse&amp;_srch=doc-info(%23toc%237139%232007%23999899997%23647656%23FLP%23display%23Volume)&amp;_cdi=7139&amp;_sort=d&amp;_docanchor=&amp;_ct=8&amp;_acct=C000050221&amp;_version=1&amp;_urlVersion=0&amp;_userid=10&amp;md5=8b3de551d14ea892b2e1bc034a664647</a></p><p></p><p>3</p><p>文献名：Continuous Time Repeated Games </p><p>作者：James Bergin and W. Bentley MacLeod </p><p>期刊：International Economic Review</p><p>卷号及页码：Vol. 34, No. 1 (Feb., 1993), pp. 21-37 &nbsp;&nbsp;(article consists of 17 pages)</p><p>电子链接：<a href="http://www.jstor.org/pss/2526948">http://www.jstor.org/pss/2526948</a></p><p></p><p>4</p><p>文献名：Bargaining one-dimensional social choices</p><p>作者：Daniel Cardonaa, , and Clara Ponsatíb</p><p>期刊：Journal of Economic Theory</p><p>卷号及页码：Volume 137, Issue 1, November 2007, Pages 627-651</p><p>电子链接：<a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&amp;_udi=B6WJ3-4N7RDK7-1&amp;_user=4991442&amp;_coverDate=11%2F30%2F2007&amp;_alid=793394367&amp;_rdoc=1&amp;_fmt=high&amp;_orig=search&amp;_cdi=6867&amp;_sort=d&amp;_docanchor=&amp;view=c&amp;_ct=2&amp;_acct=C000050221&amp;_version=1&amp;_urlVersion=0&amp;_userid=4991442&amp;md5=c19b7d9b2b41e88f1978e4c181b1be2a">http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&amp;_udi=B6WJ3-4N7RDK7-1&amp;_user=4991442&amp;_coverDate=11%2F30%2F2007&amp;_alid=793394367&amp;_rdoc=1&amp;_fmt=high&amp;_orig=search&amp;_cdi=6867&amp;_sort=d&amp;_docanchor=&amp;view=c&amp;_ct=2&amp;_acct=C000050221&amp;_version=1&amp;_urlVersion=0&amp;_userid=4991442&amp;md5=c19b7d9b2b41e88f1978e4c181b1be2a</a></p><p></p><p>5</p>文献名： The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring <p></p><p>作者：Kandori, M.</p><p>期刊：Review of Economic Studies</p><p>卷号及页码：1992, 59, 581-594.</p><p>电子链接：<a href="http://www.jstor.org/pss/2297865">http://www.jstor.org/pss/2297865</a></p><p></p><p>6</p>文献名： The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency <p></p><p>作者：Pearce, D. and E. Stachetti</p><p>期刊：Games and Economic Behavior</p><p>卷号及页码：1998, April 1998, 23, 75–96.</p><p>电子链接：<a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&amp;_udi=B6WFW-45JC9F0-27&amp;_user=4991442&amp;_rdoc=1&amp;_fmt=&amp;_orig=search&amp;_sort=d&amp;view=c&amp;_acct=C000050221&amp;_version=1&amp;_urlVersion=0&amp;_userid=4991442&amp;md5=63323a2a6be7978c3af9a89c9156078b">http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&amp;_udi=B6WFW-45JC9F0-27&amp;_user=4991442&amp;_rdoc=1&amp;_fmt=&amp;_orig=search&amp;_sort=d&amp;view=c&amp;_acct=C000050221&amp;_version=1&amp;_urlVersion=0&amp;_userid=4991442&amp;md5=63323a2a6be7978c3af9a89c9156078b</a></p><p></p><p>7</p>文献名：Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed <p></p>作者：Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine <p></p><p>期刊：The Review of Economic Studies</p><p>卷号及页码：Vol. 59, No. 3 (Jul., 1992), pp. 561-579 &nbsp;&nbsp;(article consists of 19 pages)</p><p>电子链接：<a href="http://www.jstor.org/pss/2297864">http://www.jstor.org/pss/2297864</a></p><p></p>

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