1
文献名: Perfect Public Equilibria when Players are Patient作者:Fudenberg, D., D. Levine, and S. Takahashi
期刊:Games and Economic Behavio r
卷号及页码:2007, 61. 27-49.
2
文献名: Continuous Time Limits of Discrete Time Games作者:Fudenberg, D. and D. Levine
期刊:Review of Economic Dynamics
卷号及页码:Volume 10, Issue 2, April 2007, Pages 173-192
3
文献名:Continuous Time Repeated Games
作者:James Bergin and W. Bentley MacLeod
期刊:International Economic Review
卷号及页码:Vol. 34, No. 1 (Feb., 1993), pp. 21-37 (article consists of 17 pages)
电子链接:http://www.jstor.org/pss/2526948
4
文献名:Bargaining one-dimensional social choices
作者:Daniel Cardonaa, , and Clara Ponsatíb
期刊:Journal of Economic Theory
卷号及页码:Volume 137, Issue 1, November 2007, Pages 627-651
5
文献名: The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring作者:Kandori, M.
期刊:Review of Economic Studies
卷号及页码:1992, 59, 581-594.
电子链接:http://www.jstor.org/pss/2297865
6
文献名: The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency作者:Pearce, D. and E. Stachetti
期刊:Games and Economic Behavior
卷号及页码:1998, April 1998, 23, 75–96.
7
文献名:Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 作者:Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine期刊:The Review of Economic Studies
卷号及页码:Vol. 59, No. 3 (Jul., 1992), pp. 561-579 (article consists of 19 pages)
电子链接:http://www.jstor.org/pss/2297864
[此贴子已经被作者于2008-9-20 21:32:06编辑过]


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