摘要翻译：
我们提出并估计了一个年金供求模型。为此，我们使用了来自智利的丰富数据，在智利，年金在私人市场上通过两个阶段进行买卖：第一阶段拍卖，然后讨价还价。我们建立了具有私人信息的企业模型，这些信息涉及成本和退休人员，具有不同的死亡情况和对遗产的偏好，以及企业的风险评级。我们发现大量的成本和偏好异质性，并且由于有许多公司，市场表现良好。反事实表明，用英国拍卖简化当前的机制和“关闭”风险评级增加了养老金，但只针对高储户。
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英文标题：
《Auctioning Annuities》
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作者：
Gaurab Aryal, Eduardo Fajnzylber, Maria F. Gabrielli, Manuel
Willington
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最新提交年份：
2021
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：General Economics 一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance 数量金融学
二级分类：Economics 经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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英文摘要：
We propose and estimate a model of demand and supply of annuities. To this end, we use rich data from Chile, where annuities are bought and sold in a private market via a two-stage process: first-price auctions followed by bargaining. We model firms with private information about costs and retirees with different mortalities and preferences for bequests and firms\' risk ratings. We find substantial costs and preference heterogeneity, and because there are many firms, the market performs well. Counterfactuals show that simplifying the current mechanism with English auctions and \"shutting down\" risk ratings increase pensions, but only for high-savers.
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