摘要翻译：
在许多情况下，多个不知情的代理在多个时段中的每个时段与单个知情的代理同时讨价还价。例如，工人和公司每年就工资进行谈判，公司拥有关于工人产出价值的私人信息。我研究透明度在这些环境中的影响；不知情的代理人可能会观察其他人过去的谈判结果，例如工资。我证明了在均衡状态下，每个不知情的agent将在每个阶段选择是尝试分离知情agent的类型（屏幕），还是获得相同的结果，而不管类型（池）。换句话说，代理人通过他们的讨价还价策略参与了一种实验形式。有两个主要的理论见解。首先，有一个互补的筛选效应：在均衡状态下筛选的代理人越多，每个人必须支付的信息租金就越低。第二，知情代理的收益具有一定的超模块性，这意味着带有筛选的均衡对不知情代理的偏离是“脆弱的”。我将研究结果应用于薪酬保密条例和反歧视政策的研究。我表明，令人惊讶的是，对薪酬歧视的处罚对谈判结果没有影响。我讨论了这一结果如何取决于歧视案件的法律框架，并建议进行修改，以提高反歧视条例的效力。特别是，反歧视法应排除所谓的“工资谈判抗辩”。
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英文标题：
《Screening and Information-Sharing Externalities》
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作者：
Quitz\\\'e Valenzuela-Stookey
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
In many settings, multiple uninformed agents bargain simultaneously with a single informed agent in each of multiple periods. For example, workers and firms negotiate each year over salaries, and the firm has private information about the value of workers\' output. I study the effects of transparency in these settings; uninformed agents may observe others\' past bargaining outcomes, e.g. wages. I show that in equilibrium, each uninformed agent will choose in each period whether to try to separate the informed agent\'s types (screen) or receive the same outcome regardless of type (pool). In other words, the agents engage in a form of experimentation via their bargaining strategies. There are two main theoretical insights. First, there is a complementary screening effect: the more agents screen in equilibrium, the lower the information rents that each will have to pay. Second, the payoff of the informed agent will have a certain supermodularity property, which implies that equilibria with screening are \"fragile\" to deviations by uninformed agents. I apply the results to study pay-secrecy regulations and anti-discrimination policy. I show that, surprisingly, penalties for pay discrimination have no impact on bargaining outcomes. I discuss how this result depends on the legal framework for discrimination cases, and suggest changes to enhance the efficacy of anti-discrimination regulations. In particular, anti-discrimination law should preclude the so-called \"salary negotiation defense\".
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