摘要翻译：
一个卖家正在向一个代理商出售一对可分割的互补商品。代理人只按一定比例消费货物，并自由处置任何一种货物中的超额部分。包的值和比率是代理的私有信息。在这个二维型空间模型中，我们刻画了激励约束，证明了对于一类分布，最优（期望收益最大化）机制是一个比率依赖的公布价格机制；也就是说，它对每个比率报告都有不同的张贴价格。我们确定了联合分配的附加充分条件，使一个公布价格是一个最优机制。我们还证明了当价值类型和比率类型独立分布时，最优机制是一个张贴价格机制。
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英文标题：
《Selling two complementary goods》
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作者：
Komal Malik, Kolagani Paramahamsa
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最新提交年份：
2021
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
A seller is selling a pair of divisible complementary goods to an agent. The agent consumes the goods only in a certain ratio and freely disposes of excess in either of the goods. The value of the bundle and the ratio are private information of the agent. In this two-dimensional type space model, we characterize the incentive constraints and show that the optimal (expected revenue-maximizing) mechanism is a ratio-dependent posted price mechanism for a class of distributions; that is, it has a different posted price for each ratio report. We identify additional sufficient conditions on the joint distribution for a posted price to be an optimal mechanism. We also show that the optimal mechanism is a posted price mechanism when the value and the ratio types are independently distributed.
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