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英文标题:
《The Political Economy of FDI flows into Developing Countries: Does the depth of International Trade Agreements Matter?》 --- 作者: Arslan Tariq Rana and Mazen Kebewar --- 最新提交年份: 2014 --- 英文摘要: There is considerable debate whether the domestic political institutions (specifically, the country s level of democracy) of the host developing country toward foreign investors are effective in establishing the credibility of commitments are still underway, researchers have also analyzed the effect of international institutions such as (GATT-WTO) membership and Bilateral Investment treaties (BIT) in their role of establishing the credibility of commitment to attract foreign investments. We argue that there are qualitative differences among various types of trade agreements and full-fledged trade agreements (FTA-CU) provide credibility to foreign investors and democracy level in the host country conditions this effect whereas the partial scope agreements (PSA) are not sufficient in providing credibility of commitments and not moderated by democracy. This paper analyses the impact of heterogeneous TAs, and their interaction with domestic institutions, on FDI inflows. Statistical analyses for 122 developing countries from 1970 to 2005 support this argument. The method adopted relies on fixed effects estimator which is robust to control endogeneity on a large panel dataset. The strict erogeneity of results by using a method suggested by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and no feedback effect found in sample. The results state that (1) More the FTA-CU concluded, larger the amount of FDI inflows are attracted into the developing countries and PSA are insignificant in determining the FDI inflow; (2) FTA CU are complementary to democratic regime whereas the conditional effect of PSA with democracy on levels of FDI inflows is insignificant. --- 中文摘要: 关于东道国对外国投资者的国内政治制度(具体而言,是该国的民主水平)是否能有效地建立承诺的可信度,仍存在相当大的争议,研究人员还分析了国际机构,如(GATT-WTO)成员资格和双边投资条约(BIT)在建立吸引外国投资承诺可信度方面的作用。我们认为,各种类型的贸易协定之间存在质的差异,成熟的贸易协定(FTA-CU)为外国投资者提供了可信度,东道国的民主水平也满足了这种效果,而部分范围协定(PSA)不足以提供承诺的可信度,也不受民主的制约。本文分析了异质性FDI流入及其与国内机构的互动影响。1970年至2005年对122个发展中国家的统计分析支持了这一观点。所采用的方法依赖于固定效应估计器,该估计器对控制大型面板数据集的内生性具有鲁棒性。Baier和Bergstrand(2007)提出的方法得出的结果具有严格的性别差异性,在样本中未发现反馈效应。结果表明:(1)FTA-CU得出的结论越多,吸引到发展中国家的FDI流入量就越大,PSA在决定FDI流入量方面不显著;(2) FTA CU是对民主制度的补充,而PSA与民主制度对FDI流入水平的条件效应并不显著。 --- 分类信息: 一级分类:Quantitative Finance 数量金融学 二级分类:General Finance 一般财务 分类描述:Development of general quantitative methodologies with applications in finance 通用定量方法的发展及其在金融中的应用 -- --- PDF下载: --> |
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