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英文标题:
《To bail-out or to bail-in? Answers from an agent-based model》 --- 作者: Peter Klimek, Sebastian Poledna, J. Doyne Farmer, Stefan Thurner --- 最新提交年份: 2014 --- 英文摘要: Since beginning of the 2008 financial crisis almost half a trillion euros have been spent to financially assist EU member states in taxpayer-funded bail-outs. These crisis resolutions are often accompanied by austerity programs causing political and social friction on both domestic and international levels. The question of how to resolve failing financial institutions under which economic preconditions is therefore a pressing and controversial issue of vast political importance. In this work we employ an agent-based model to study the economic and financial ramifications of three highly relevant crisis resolution mechanisms. To establish the validity of the model we show that it reproduces a series of key stylized facts if the financial and real economy. The distressed institution can either be closed via a purchase & assumption transaction, it can be bailed-out using taxpayer money, or it may be bailed-in in a debt-to-equity conversion. We find that for an economy characterized by low unemployment and high productivity the optimal crisis resolution with respect to financial stability and economic productivity is to close the distressed institution. For economies in recession with high unemployment the bail-in tool provides the most efficient crisis resolution mechanism. Under no circumstances do taxpayer-funded bail-out schemes outperform bail-ins with private sector involvement. --- 中文摘要: 自2008年金融危机开始以来,近5万亿欧元被用于在财政上帮助欧盟成员国进行纳税人资助的纾困。这些危机解决方案往往伴随着紧缩计划,在国内和国际层面造成政治和社会摩擦。因此,如何解决在经济先决条件下倒闭的金融机构的问题是一个具有巨大政治重要性的紧迫而有争议的问题。在这项工作中,我们采用了一个基于代理的模型来研究三种高度相关的危机解决机制的经济和金融后果。为了证明该模型的有效性,我们证明它再现了金融和实体经济的一系列关键的程式化事实。陷入困境的机构可以通过收购和假设交易予以关闭,也可以使用纳税人的钱对其进行纾困,也可以通过债转股进行纾困。我们发现,对于一个以低失业率和高生产率为特征的经济体,就金融稳定和经济生产率而言,最佳危机解决方案是关闭陷入困境的机构。对于失业率高的衰退经济体,自救工具提供了最有效的危机解决机制。在任何情况下,纳税人资助的纾困计划都不会比有私营部门参与的纾困计划表现更好。 --- 分类信息: 一级分类:Quantitative Finance 数量金融学 二级分类:General Finance 一般财务 分类描述:Development of general quantitative methodologies with applications in finance 通用定量方法的发展及其在金融中的应用 -- --- PDF下载: --> |
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