英文标题：
《Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences》
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作者：
Daniela Bubboloni and Michele Gori
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最新提交年份：
2016
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英文摘要：
Many classical social choice correspondences are resolute only in the case of two alternatives and an odd number of individuals. Thus, in most cases, they admit several resolute refinements, each of them naturally interpreted as a tie-breaking rule, satisfying different properties. In this paper we look for classes of social choice correspondences which admit resolute refinements fulfilling suitable versions of anonymity and neutrality. In particular, supposing that individuals and alternatives have been exogenously partitioned into subcommittees and subclasses, we find out arithmetical conditions on the sizes of subcommittees and subclasses that are necessary and sufficient for making any social choice correspondence which is efficient, anonymous with respect to subcommittees, neutral with respect to subclasses and possibly immune to the reversal bias admit a resolute refinement sharing the same properties.
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中文摘要：
许多经典的社会选择对应只有在两个选择和奇数个个体的情况下才是坚决的。因此，在大多数情况下，它们接受了几项果断的改进，每一项都自然地被解释为打破平局的规则，满足不同的特性。在本文中，我们寻找社会选择对应的类别，这些类别允许对匿名性和中立性的合适版本进行坚决的改进。特别是，假设个体和替代品被外生地划分为子委员会和子类，我们找出子委员会和子类大小的算术条件，这些条件对于进行任何社会选择通信是必要和充分的，对于子委员会来说是有效的、匿名的，对于子类来说是中性的，并且可能不受反转偏差的影响，允许使用具有相同属性的坚决细化。
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分类信息：

一级分类：Quantitative Finance 数量金融学
二级分类：Economics 经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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