英文标题：
《A Game Theoretic Setting of Capitation Versus Fee-For-Service Payment
Systems》
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作者：
Allison Koenecke
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最新提交年份：
2019
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英文摘要：
We aim to determine whether a game-theoretic model between an insurer and a healthcare practice yields a predictive equilibrium that incentivizes either player to deviate from a fee-for-service to capitation payment system. Using United States data from various primary care surveys, we find that non-extreme equilibria (i.e., shares of patients, or shares of patient visits, seen under a fee-for-service payment system) can be derived from a Stackelberg game if insurers award a non-linear bonus to practices based on performance. Overall, both insurers and practices can be incentivized to embrace capitation payments somewhat, but potentially at the expense of practice performance.
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中文摘要：
我们的目的是确定保险公司和医疗机构之间的博弈论模型是否会产生一种预测均衡，从而激励任何一方偏离按人头付费的服务收费制度。使用美国各种初级保健调查的数据，我们发现，如果保险公司根据绩效向实践发放非线性奖金，则可以从斯塔克伯格博弈中得出非极端均衡（即，在服务付费制度下看到的患者份额或患者就诊份额）。总的来说，可以鼓励保险公司和机构在一定程度上接受按人头付费，但可能会以牺牲机构绩效为代价。
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：General Economics 一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance 数量金融学
二级分类：Economics 经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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