搜索
人大经济论坛 附件下载

附件下载

所在主题:
文件名:  37331.rar
资料下载链接地址: https://bbs.pinggu.org/a-37331.html
本附件包括:
  • CONTRACT DESIGN AND SELF-CONTROL.pdf
附件大小:
181.2 KB   举报本内容
<P><FONT size=4>在契约理论的研究中,行为经济学关注问题的考虑日益受到重视。</FONT></P>
<P><FONT size=4>特推荐几篇这方面的重要文献</FONT></P>
<P><FONT size=4><b>一、CONTRACT DESIGN AND SELF-CONTROL THEORY AND EVIDENCE</b></FONT></P>
<P><FONT size=4><b> Quarterly Journal of Economics2004 119(2): 353-402.</b></FONT></P>
<P><FONT size=4><b> STEFANO DELLAVIGNA AND ULRIKE MALMENDIER</b></FONT></P>
<P><b><FONT size=4>摘要:How do rational firms respond to consumer biases? In this paper we analyze the profit-maximizing contract design of firms if consumers have <FONT color=#ff0066>time-inconsistent preferences and are partially naive about it. </FONT>We consider markets for two types of goods: goods with immediate costs and delayed benefits (investment goods) such as health club attendance, and goods with immediate benefits and delayed costs (leisure goods) such as credit card-financed consumption. We establish three features of the profit-maximizing contract design with partially naive time-inconsistent consumers. First, firms price investment goods below marginal cost. Second, firms price leisure goods above marginal cost. Third, for all types of goods firms introduce switching costs and charge back-loaded fees. The contractual design targets consumer misperception of future consumption and underestimation of the renewal probability. The predictions of the theory match the empirical contract design in the credit card, gambling, health club, life insurance, mail order, mobile phone, and vacation time-sharing industries. We also show that time inconsistency has adverse effects on consumer welfare only if consumers are naive.</FONT></b></P>
<P><FONT size=3>【We thank four exceptional referees, George Baker, Daniel Benjamin, Drew
Fudenberg, Luis Garicano, Jerry Green, Oliver Hart, Caroline Hoxby, Markus
Mo¨bius, Daniele Paserman, Ben Polak, Andrei Shleifer, and in particular Philippe Aghion, Edward Glaeser, Lawrence Katz, and David Laibson. We received helpful comments from participants of seminars at the Econometric Society Summer Meeting 2001, AEA Meeting 2002, the Behavioral Public Finance Conference 2003, the University of California at Berkeley, Humboldt University (Berlin), Bonn University, Boston University, Harvard University, INSEAD, University of Maryland (College Park), the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Northwestern, Stanford, Yale, and Zurich universities. Nageeb Ali, Saurabh Bhargava, Madhav Chandrasekher, Tricia Glynn, Ming Mai, Boris Nenchev, and Christine Yee provided excellent research assistance. For financial support, DellaVigna thanks Bank of Italy and Harvard University, and Malmendier thanks Harvard University and the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD).】</FONT></P>
<P>
</P>

[此贴子已经被作者于2006-1-12 13:19:12编辑过]



    熟悉论坛请点击新手指南
下载说明
1、论坛支持迅雷和网际快车等p2p多线程软件下载,请在上面选择下载通道单击右健下载即可。
2、论坛会定期自动批量更新下载地址,所以请不要浪费时间盗链论坛资源,盗链地址会很快失效。
3、本站为非盈利性质的学术交流网站,鼓励和保护原创作品,拒绝未经版权人许可的上传行为。本站如接到版权人发出的合格侵权通知,将积极的采取必要措施;同时,本站也将在技术手段和能力范围内,履行版权保护的注意义务。
(如有侵权,欢迎举报)
二维码

扫码加我 拉你入群

请注明:姓名-公司-职位

以便审核进群资格,未注明则拒绝

GMT+8, 2025-12-24 18:54