64194.rar-经管之家资源下载-人大经济论坛

签到
- 苹果/安卓/wp
- 苹果/安卓/wp
客户端
0.0

0.00

经管百科

人大经济论坛 › 附件下载

附件下载


所在主题： [分享]Fudenberg博弈论reading list里面的20多篇经典论文
文件名: 64194.rar
资料下载链接地址: https://bbs.pinggu.org/a-64194.html
本附件包括： Aumann Agreeing to Disagree.pdf Aumann Common Priors A Reply to Gul.pdf Aumann Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian -Rationality.pdf Aumann&BrandenburgEpistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium.pdf Battigali On rationalizability in extensive games.pdf Battigali Rationalization and incomplete information.pdf Battigali@Bonnano Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory.pdf Bernheim Rationalizable Strategic Behavior.pdf Brandenburg&Dekel Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge.pdf Brandenburg&Dekel Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria.pdf Carlsson&Van Damme Global Games and Equilibrium Selection.pdf Dekel&Lipman&Rosthini Standard State-Space Models Preclude Unawareness.pdf Ely&Peski Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability.pdf Feinberg Subjective reasoning in dynamic games.pdf Frank Gul A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View.pdf Harsarnyi Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players I.pdf Harsarnyi Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players II.pdf Harsarnyi Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players III.pdf Harsarnyi Selton A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information.pdf Kahneman Evaluation by moments.pdf Milgrom&Roberts Predation reputation and entry detterence.pdf Pearce Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection.pdf Rubinstein The Electronic Mail Game Strategic Behavior Under Almost Common Knowledge.pdf Weinstein&Yildiz Impact of Higher-Order Uncertainty.pdf
附件大小: 36.03 MB 举报本内容
<P align=center><B></B>这20多篇papers都是我照着下面的readinglist的第一部分挨篇下载的，大家应该充分相信这里每一篇都是Game theory的经典，有一定基础又真打算在这个方向发展下去的同学这些论文都是必读的。现在发上来希望对大家能有帮助。</P> <P align=center>考虑到我下载这些拉论文也不容易，大家如果真觉得喜欢就顶一下帖子，那样才能有更多的人看到。这个list后面几部分列出的论文我过些时候也会都下载下来，到时候再传给大家。另外，如果可能，希望版主能奖励一些现金。</P> <P align=center>补：part1的论文还是有两三篇没下载到，我自己则另外添了几篇进去。总共是24篇</P> <P align=center></P> <P align=center><B>Economics 2053: </B>Topics in Game Theory</P> <P align=center><o:p></o:p></P> <P>The class website is http://www.courses.fas.harvard.edu/~econ2053/</P> <P>OH: Fudenberg Wed 2-4</P> <P> Ambrus Wed 2-4 </P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>To get credit for the class, write a paper and/or give a presentation.</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P><B><U>Part II: Selected Topics In Game Theory<o:p></o:p></U></B></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Suggested Textbooks:</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole [1991] <I>Game Theory</I>, <st1:place><st1:City>Cambridge</st1:City>, <st1:State>MA</st1:State></st1:place>:MIT Press</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Myerson, R. B. [1991] <I>Game theory: analysis of conflict</I>, <st1:place><st1:City>Cambridge</st1:City>, <st1:State>MA</st1:State></st1:place>: Harvard University Press</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Fagin, R., J. Y. Halpern, Y. Moses and M. Y. Vardi [1995] <I>Reasoning about knowledge</I>, <st1:place><st1:City>Cambridge</st1:City>, <st1:State>MA</st1:State></st1:place>: MIT Press</P> <P><I><o:p></o:p></I></P> <P><B>1. Modeling knowledge and beliefs in interactive environments<o:p></o:p></B></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Harsanyi, J. [1967-68]: “Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players, I, II, III,” <I>Management Science</I> 14 (3) <a href="http://www.jstor.org.ezp1.harvard.edu/view/00251909/di012629/01p00832/0?frame=noframe&userID=80673ce1@harvard.edu/01cc9933410050148b639&dpi=3&config=jstor" target="_blank" >159-182</A>, 14 (5)<a href="http://www.jstor.org.ezp1.harvard.edu/view/00251909/di012631/01p01225/0" target="_blank" > 320-334</A>, 14 (7) <a href="http://www.jstor.org.ezp1.harvard.edu/view/00251909/di012633/01p0164k/0" target="_blank" >486-502</A>.</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Aumann, R. [1976] “<a href="http://www.jstor.org.ezp1.harvard.edu/view/00905364/di983882/98p00183/0" target="_blank" >Agreeing to Disagree</A>,” <I>The Annals of Statistics</I> 4 (6), 1236-1239</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Pearce, D. [1984] “<a href="http://www.jstor.org.ezp1.harvard.edu/view/00129682/di952672/95p01814/0" target="_blank" >Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection</A>,” <I>Econometrica</I> 52 (5), 1029-1050</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Bernheim, D. [1984] “<a href="http://www.jstor.org.ezp1.harvard.edu/view/00129682/di952672/95p0180e/0" target="_blank" >Rationalizable Strategic Behavior</A>,” <I>Econometrica</I> 52 (4), 1007-1028</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Aumann, R. [1987] “<a href="http://www.jstor.org.ezp1.harvard.edu/view/00129682/di952687/95p02716/0" target="_blank" >Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian -Rationality</A>,” <I>Econometrica</I> 55 (1), 1-18</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Brandenburger, A. and <st1:place>E. Dekel</st1:place> [1987] “<a href="http://www.jstor.org.ezp1.harvard.edu/view/00129682/di952692/95p0361i/0" target="_blank" >Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria</A>,” <I>Econometrica</I> 55 (6), 1391-1402</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Tan, T.C.C. and S.R.C.Werlang[1988] “The Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games,” <I>Journal of Economic Theory</I> 45 (2), 370-391 </P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Fudenberg, D., D. MKreps. and D. K. Levine [1988] “On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements..,” <I>Journal of Economic Theory</I> 44 (2), 354-80<o:p></o:p></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Rubinstein, A. [1989] “<a href="http://www.jstor.org.ezp1.harvard.edu/view/00028282/di950051/95p0006b/0" target="_blank" >The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior Under ‘Almost Common Knowledge</A>,’” <I>American Economic Review</I> 79 (3), 385-391</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Dekel, E. and D. Fudenberg[1990] “Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty,” <I>Journal of Economic Theory</I> 52 (2), 243-67</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Brandenburger, A. and E. Dekel [1993] “<a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezp1.harvard.edu/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6WJ3-45P12V7-1S-1&_cdi=6867&_orig=browse&_coverDate=02/28/1993&_sk=999409998&view=c&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkzS&_acct=C000014438&_version=1&_userid=209690&md5=b6e490ef40561e28ef6fc22e37f" target="_blank" >Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge</A>,” <I>Journal of Economic Theory</I> 59 (1), 189-198</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Carlsson, H. And E. Van Damme [1993] “<a href="http://www.jstor.org.ezp1.harvard.edu/view/00129682/di982572/98p0185z/0" target="_blank" >Global Games and Equilibrium Selection</A>,” <I>Econometrica</I> 61 (5), 989-1018<o:p></o:p></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Aumann, R. and A. Brandenburger [1995] “<a href="http://www.jstor.org.ezp1.harvard.edu/view/00129682/di982584/98p0035v/0" target="_blank" >Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium</A>,” <I>Econometrica</I> 63 (5), 1161-1180</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Dekel, E. and F. Gul [1997] “Rationality and Knowledge in Game Theory” <I>in Advances in Economics and Econometrics, D. Kreps and K. Wallis, eds. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK<o:p></o:p></I></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Gul, F. [1998] "<a href="http://www.jstor.org.ezp1.harvard.edu/view/00129682/di007683/00p0056q/0" target="_blank" >A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View</A>," <I>Econometrica</I> 66 (4), 923-928</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Battigalli, P [1997] “<a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezp1.harvard.edu/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6WJ3-45S9389-2H-1&_cdi=6867&_orig=browse&_coverDate=05/31/1997&_sk=999259998&view=c&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkWW&_acct=C000014438&_version=1&_userid=209690&md5=f4d3609dfd32f6d000c5c426fd8" target="_blank" >On rationalizability in extensive games</A>,” <I>Journal of Economic Theory</I> 74 (1), 40-61</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Dekel, E., B. Lipman and A. Rustichini [1998] “<a href="http://www.jstor.org.ezp1.harvard.edu/view/00129682/di007680/00p00087/0" target="_blank" >Standard State-Space Models Preclude Unawareness</A>,” <I>Econometrica</I> 66 (1), 159-174</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Battigalli, P. and G. Bonanno [1999] “Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory,” <I>Research In Economics</I> 53 (2), 149-225</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Morris, S. and H. Shin [2001] “Global Games: Theory and Applications..,” <I>Yale Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper</I><o:p></o:p></P> <P><a href="http://www.econ.yale.edu/~sm326/seattle.pdf" target="_blank" >http://www.econ.yale.edu/~sm326/seattle.pdf</A></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Feinberg,Y [2002] “Subjective reasoning in dynamic games,” <I>mimeo </I><st1:place><st1:PlaceName><I>Stanford</I></st1:PlaceName><I> </I><st1:PlaceType><I>University</I></st1:PlaceType></st1:place><I><o:p></o:p></I></P> <P><a href="http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/feinberg/Pdf/subepi1.PDF" target="_blank" >http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/feinberg/Pdf/subepi1.PDF</A></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Morris, S. [2002] “Typical Types,” <I>mimeo Yale</I></P> <P><I> <a href="http://www.courses.fas.harvard.edu/~ec2052/Papers_Not_Available_Elsewhere/" target="_blank" >http://www.courses.fas.harvard.edu/~ec2052/Papers_Not_Available_Elsewhere/</A><o:p></o:p></I></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Battigalli, P. and M. Siniscalchi [2003] “Rationalization and incomplete information,” <I>mimeo Bocconi and Northwestern<o:p></o:p></I></P> <P><a href="http://faculty.econ.northwestern.edu/faculty/siniscalchi/bs03iig.pdf" target="_blank" >http://faculty.econ.northwestern.edu/faculty/siniscalchi/bs03iig.pdf</A></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Yildiz,M. and J. Weinstein [2003] “Impact of Higher-Order Uncertainty,” <I>mimeo MIT</I></P> <P><a href="http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=588" target="_blank" >http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=588</A></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Ely, J. and M. Peski [2004] “Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability,” <I>mimeo Northwestern</I></P> <P><EM></EM></P> <P><EM></EM></P> <P><B>2. Cheap talk<o:p></o:p></B></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Crawford, V. and J. Sobel [1982] “<a href="http://www.jstor.org.ezp1.harvard.edu/view/00129682/di952662/95p0244z/0" target="_blank" >Strategic information transmission</A>,” <I>Econometrica</I> 50 (6), 1431-51</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Rabin, M. [1990] “Communication between Rational Agents,” <I>JET</I> 51, 144-70</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Farrell, J. [1993] “<a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezp1.harvard.edu/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6WFW-45PMW7N-2-1&_cdi=6805&_orig=browse&_coverDate=10/31/1993&_sk=999949995&view=c&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkzS&_acct=C000014438&_version=1&_userid=209690&md5=7d8b84e7d9e5c18531dd429f3f23" target="_blank" >Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games</A>,” <I>Games and Economic Behavior</I> 5 (4), 514-31</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Farrell, J. and M. Rabin [1996] “<a href="http://www.jstor.org.ezp1.harvard.edu/view/08953309/di980588/98p0325e/0" target="_blank" >Cheap talk</A>,” <I>Journal of Economic Perspectives</I> 10 (3), 103-18</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Zapater, <st1:place>I.</st1:place> [1997] “<a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezp1.harvard.edu/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6WJ3-45M2VY2-R-1&_cdi=6867&_orig=search&_coverDate=01/31/1997&_qd=1&_sk=999279998&view=c&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkWA&_acct=C000014438&_version=1&_userid=209690&md5=5aa5c41faf9b26e1f9b74f" target="_blank" >Credible proposals in communication games</A>,” <I>Journal of Economic Theory</I> 72 (1), 173-97</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Glazer, J. and A. Rubinstein [2001] “<a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezp1.harvard.edu/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6WFW-458NM4S-W-1&_cdi=6805&_orig=search&_coverDate=08/31/2001&_qd=1&_sk=999639997&view=c&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkWz&_acct=C000014438&_version=1&_userid=209690&md5=8cc690c7ec8fabe0cefb2d" target="_blank" >Debates and Decisions: On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules</A>,” <I>Games and Economic Behavior</I> 36 (2), 158-73</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Battaglini, M. [2002] “<a href="http://proquest.umi.com.ezp1.harvard.edu/pqdweb?index=0&did=000000138354591&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=6&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1094849990&clientId=11201" target="_blank" >Multiple referrals and multidimensional cheap talk</A>,” <I>Econometrica</I> 70 (4), 1379-140</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Aumann, R. and S. Hart [2003] “Long cheap talk”; <I>Econometrica </I>71 (6), 1619-1660</P> <P><a href="http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/~hart/papers/long.pdf" target="_blank" >http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/~hart/papers/long.pdf</A></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Olszewski, W. [2002] “Informal communication,” <I>JET forthcoming</I></P> <P><a href="http://www.nyu.edu/sed2002/pdfs/gt1-2-txt.pdf" target="_blank" >http://www.nyu.edu/sed2002/pdfs/gt1-2-txt.pdf</A></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Austen-Smith, D. and T. Feddersen [2002] “Deliberation and voting rules,” <I>mimeo </I><st1:place><st1:PlaceName><I>Northwestern</I></st1:PlaceName><I> </I><st1:PlaceType><I>University</I></st1:PlaceType></st1:place><I><o:p></o:p></I></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Gerardi, D. and L. Yariv [2003] “Putting your ballot where your mouth is,” <I>mimeo </I><st1:place><st1:PlaceName><I>Yale</I></st1:PlaceName><I> </I><st1:PlaceType><I>University</I></st1:PlaceType></st1:place><I> and UCLA<o:p></o:p></I></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Gerardi, D. and L. Yariv [2003] “Committee design in the presence of communication,” <I>mimeo </I><st1:place><st1:PlaceName><I>Yale</I></st1:PlaceName><I> </I><st1:PlaceType><I>University</I></st1:PlaceType></st1:place><I> and UCLA<o:p></o:p></I></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Levy, G. and R. Razin [2003] “Multidimensional cheap talk,” mimeo LSE and NYU</P> <P><a href="http://homepages.nyu.edu/~rr71/CT.pdf" target="_blank" >http://homepages.nyu.edu/~rr71/CT.pdf</A></P> <P><B><o:p></o:p></B></P> <P><B>3. Coalitional bargaining<o:p></o:p></B></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Bloch, F. [1996] “Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division,” <I>GAEB</I> 14 (1), 90-123</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Chatterjee, K., B. Dutta, D. Ray and K. Sengupta [1993] “<a href="http://www.jstor.org.ezp1.harvard.edu/view/00346527/di990706/99p03382/0" target="_blank" >A noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining</A>,” <I>ReStud</I> 60 (2), 463-477</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Ray, D. and R. Vohra [1997] “<a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezp1.harvard.edu/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6WJ3-45KV13P-V-1&_cdi=6867&_orig=search&_coverDate=03/31/1997&_qd=1&_sk=999269998&view=c&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkzk&_acct=C000014438&_version=1&_userid=209690&md5=cbbeaecbed4ac30d13b37c" target="_blank" >Equilibrium binding agreements</A>,” <I>JET</I> 73 (1), 30-78</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Ray, D. and R. Vohra [1999] “<a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezp1.harvard.edu/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6WFW-45JC97N-V-1&_cdi=6805&_orig=search&_coverDate=01/31/1999&_qd=1&_sk=999739997&view=c&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkzk&_acct=C000014438&_version=1&_userid=209690&md5=87e9f1b350d0836de1f282" target="_blank" >A theory of endogeneous coalition structures</A>,” <I>GAEB</I> 26 (2), 286-336</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Ray, D. and R. Vohra [2001] “<a href="http://proquest.umi.com.ezp1.harvard.edu/pqdlink?index=0&did=000000095456200&SrchMode=1&sid=2&Fmt=6&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1094850317&clientId=11201" target="_blank" >Coalitional power and public goods</A>,” <I>JPE</I> 109, 1355-1383</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Konishi, H. and D. Ray [2003] “<a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezp1.harvard.edu/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6WJ3-485XHBW-4-RH&_cdi=6867&_orig=search&_coverDate=05/31/2003&_qd=1&_sk=998899998&view=c&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkWW&_acct=C000014438&_version=1&_userid=209690&md5=1eed8313d287b34a0ddfe" target="_blank" >Coalition formation as a dynamic process</A>,” <I>JET</I> 110 (1), 1-41</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Gomes, A. [2004] “Multilateral contracting with externalities,” <I>mimeo UPenn</I></P> <P><a href="http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~gomes/mcever4.pdf" target="_blank" >http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~gomes/mcever4.pdf</A></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P><B><o:p></o:p></B></P> <P><B>5. Interactive preferences, Psychology and games<o:p></o:p></B></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Schall, L. D. [1972] “Interdependent utilities and Pareto optimality,” <I>QJE</I> 86 (1), 19-24</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Pearce, D. [1983] “Nonpaternalistic sympathy and the inefficiency of consistent intertemporal plans,” <I>mimeo Yale</I></P> <P><I>not on the web, will be distributed at the course<o:p></o:p></I></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Ray, D. [1987] “Intergenerational altruism,” <I>JET</I> 41 (4), 112-32</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Hori, H. and S. Kanaya [1989] “Utility Functionals with Nonpaternalistic Intergenerational Altruism,” <I>JET</I> 49 (2), 241-65</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Bruce, N. and M. Waldman [1991] “<a href="http://www.jstor.org.ezp1.harvard.edu/view/00028282/di971054/97p0050d/0" target="_blank" >Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Nonpaternalistic</A>,” <I>AER</I> 81 (5), 1345-51<o:p></o:p></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Geanakoplos J., D. Pearce and E. Stachetti [1989] “Psychological games and sequential rationality,” <I>GAEB </I>1 (1), 60-79</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Rabin, M. [1993] “<a href="http://www.jstor.org.ezp1.harvard.edu/view/00028282/di976321/97p0364m/0" target="_blank" >Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics</A>,” <I>AER </I>83 (5), 1281-1302<o:p></o:p></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Rabin M. [1998] “<a href="http://www.jstor.org.ezp1.harvard.edu/view/00220515/di010566/01p0003b/0" target="_blank" >Psychology and economics</A>,” <I>Journal of Economic Literature</I> 36 (1), 11-46<o:p></o:p></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Fehr, E. and S. Gachter [1998] “<a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezp1.harvard.edu/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6V64-3VKKB1K-15-1&_cdi=5804&_orig=search&_coverDate=05/31/1998&_qd=1&_sk=999579996&view=c&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkzk&_acct=C000014438&_version=1&_userid=209690&md5=e00a7fee7d0b3511d1b2e" target="_blank" >Reciprocity and Economics: The Economic Implications of Homo Reciprocans</A>,” <I>European Economic Review</I> 42, 845-59</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Fehr, E. and K. Scmidt [1999] “<a href="http://caliban.ingentaselect.com.ezp1.harvard.edu/vl=5173395/cl=39/nw=1/fm=docpdf/rpsv/cw/mitpress/00335533/v114n3/s4/p817" target="_blank" >A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation</A>,” <I>QJE</I> 114 (3), 817-68</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Fehr, E. and S. Gachter [2000] “<a href="http://www.jstor.org.ezp1.harvard.edu/view/08953309/di014723/01p02353/0" target="_blank" >Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity</A>,” <I>Journal of Economic Perspectives</I> 14 (3), 159-81<br><br></P> <P>Kockesen, L., E. Ok and R. Sethi [2000] “<a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezp1.harvard.edu/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6WJ3-45FCBRN-1H-1&_cdi=6867&_orig=search&_coverDate=06/30/2000&_qd=1&_sk=999079997&view=c&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkzV&_acct=C000014438&_version=1&_userid=209690&md5=cd31a3d3dd78a17b795d6" target="_blank" >The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences</A>,” <I>JET</I> 92 (2), 274-99</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Lopomo, G. and E. Ok [2001] “Bargaining, Interdependence, and the Rationality of Fair Division,” <I>RAND Journal of Economics</I> 32, 263-83</P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P>Camerer, C. [2001] “Behavioral Game Theory: The Psychology of Strategic Thinking,” <I>mimeo California Institute of Technology</I></P> <P><a href="http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~camerer/Camerer.pdf" target="_blank" >http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~camerer/Camerer.pdf</A></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P> <P><o:p></o:p></P><br> [此贴子已经被作者于2006-9-18 3:23:05编辑过]
熟悉论坛请点击新手指南
下载说明
1、论坛支持迅雷和网际快车等p2p多线程软件下载，请在上面选择下载通道单击右健下载即可。 2、论坛会定期自动批量更新下载地址,所以请不要浪费时间盗链论坛资源,盗链地址会很快失效。 3、本站为非盈利性质的学术交流网站,鼓励和保护原创作品，拒绝未经版权人许可的上传行为。本站如接到版权人发出的合格侵权通知，将积极的采取必要措施；同时，本站也将在技术手段和能力范围内，履行版权保护的注意义务。 (如有侵权，欢迎举报)

二维码

扫码加我拉你入群

请注明：姓名-公司-职位

以便审核进群资格，未注明则拒绝

京ICP备16021002号-2 京B2-20170662号京公网安备 11010802022788号论坛法律顾问：王进律师知识产权保护声明免责及隐私声明