[经济学] 在线平台市场的最优搜索分割机制 [推广有奖]

摘要翻译：
爱彼迎、Hotels.com、Amazon、Uber和Lyft等在线平台可以控制和优化产品搜索的许多方面，以提高市场效率。这里我们关注一个常见的模型，称为歧视控制模型，在该模型中，平台选择显示以市场决定的价格销售产品的卖家子集，并且买家有兴趣从其中一个卖家那里购买单个产品。在常用的买方单品选择模型--多项式logit模型和卖方竞争的Bertrand博弈模型下，我们得到了以下结果：为了社会福利最大化，平台的最优策略是展示所有产品；然而，为了最大化收益，最优策略是只展示质量高于一定阈值的产品子集。将我们的结果推广到Cournot竞争模型，证明了社会福利最大化和收益最大化的最优搜索分割机制也具有简单的阈值结构。每种情况下的阈值取决于所有产品的质量、平台的目标和卖家的竞争模型，并可以在线性时间内以产品数量计算。
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英文标题：
《Optimal Search Segmentation Mechanisms for Online Platform Markets》
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作者：
Zhenzhe Zheng and R. Srikant
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  Online platforms, such as Airbnb, hotels.com, Amazon, Uber and Lyft, can control and optimize many aspects of product search to improve the efficiency of marketplaces. Here we focus on a common model, called the discriminatory control model, where the platform chooses to display a subset of sellers who sell products at prices determined by the market and a buyer is interested in buying a single product from one of the sellers. Under the commonly-used model for single product selection by a buyer, called the multinomial logit model, and the Bertrand game model for competition among sellers, we show the following result: to maximize social welfare, the optimal strategy for the platform is to display all products; however, to maximize revenue, the optimal strategy is to only display a subset of the products whose qualities are above a certain threshold. We extend our results to Cournot competition model, and show that the optimal search segmentation mechanisms for both social welfare maximization and revenue maximization also have simple threshold structures. The threshold in each case depends on the quality of all products, the platform's objective and seller's competition model, and can be computed in linear time in the number of products.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1908.07489