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[下载]CDO developers article attachment 金融类 murwhin 2008-2-9 3 2489 geokaran 2015-3-16 18:53:52
上财经院本科生在2013年第4期《经济研究》发表leading article 学术道德监督 老吃老做的狗卵 2013-5-27 182 25057 lingxiu 2013-10-30 21:00:31
【追悼科斯】大师陨落,后者何人? attach_img 制度经济学 鄂东蝈蝈 2013-9-3 5 1349 SilentMajority 2013-9-3 18:09:30
哪位好心人能帮忙下载这篇论文<Beyond It versus Stratonovich> 谢谢! attachment 求助成功区 cleverblue 2013-8-12 2 1235 cleverblue 2013-8-31 23:32:41
Foreign Bank Entry, Performance of Domestic Banks and the Sequence of Financial - [阅读权限 20]attachment 会计与财务管理 LWZ123 2013-5-30 0 142 LWZ123 2013-5-30 04:10:05
悬赏 [ 500 to thank you ] An article hard to find - [悬赏 1 个论坛币] 文献求助专区 pertain 2013-1-28 3 1225 pertain 2013-2-1 11:06:25
ratio analysis article pdf attachment 金融学(理论版) kingpin 2007-11-19 2 1755 kingpin 2011-12-31 22:07:19
[分享]foreign exchange exposure article attachment 金融学(理论版) daisydai 2007-3-28 2 2571 deeplake 2011-11-18 23:59:22
An article about global stock markets in the 20th century attachment 金融学(理论版) liuguangyicai 2006-12-16 0 1613 liuguangyicai 2011-11-2 16:25:13
An article about CAPM attachment 金融学(理论版) liuguangyicai 2006-12-16 0 2424 liuguangyicai 2011-11-2 16:23:47
article writing secret( english version) attachment 金融学(理论版) codfish 2006-9-1 0 1592 codfish 2011-10-25 06:25:39
credit default swaptions, a article from Journal of Fixed Income attachment 金融学(理论版) hyloemi 2006-8-5 0 2617 hyloemi 2011-10-24 04:32:14
good article on Current developments in productivity and efficiency measurement attachment 计量经济学与统计软件 3670 2005-10-9 2 2029 jasoning 2011-10-10 12:51:13
Article - Finance - Wharton Business School - Finance Application of Game Theor attachment 博弈论 nocturne 2005-8-26 3 2230 罗马朗 2011-10-8 18:20:00
sharing an excellent article:Investors continue pull out from India; Asia sees i 真实世界经济学(含财经时事) F-SCM 2009-3-1 0 1676 F-SCM 2009-3-1 02:34:00
[推荐]A New York Times Article On Risk Management 金融类 superwilson 2009-1-5 1 2623 superwilson 2009-1-5 03:48:00
Harvard Business Review (Article) - Social Cost of Fraud and attachment 版权审核区(不对外开放) chaijian 2008-1-3 4 2378 chaijian 2008-1-5 23:20:00
已在http:www.fenglin.infobbsview_article.php?id=428129枫林在线论坛做了专门推荐. 站务与外事 wolaiyanluo 2007-3-15 1 3808 jhwang 2006-8-27 21:13:00
[分享] 一生中的四个人(与大家分享,很经典的article) 休闲灌水 zgj025 2006-4-9 9 1652 lichao6800 2006-4-14 11:59:00
Notes on Krugman’s Article on Myth of Asian Miracle 经济史与经济思想史 Corleone 2005-12-8 4 3071 Corleone 2005-12-9 12:43:00

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分享 What does Hillary stand for? Hillary Clinton in 2016 4.11
So^^So 2015-4-17 17:50
What does Hillary stand for? Hillary Clinton in 2016 On April 4, The Economist published an article named “ What does Hillary stand for? Hillary Clinton in 2016 ”. Mrs Clinton has had her eye on the top job—president for a long time. In 2008, She nearly won it in 2008 and is in many ways a stronger candidate now. Thegame isriggedbybigmoney. She has built a vast campaign machine, of course, with her husband, the former president. The moment Mrs Clinton turns the key, it will begin openly to suck up contributions, spit out sound bites and roll over her rivals. There is a bitter irony. What we most care about is : what does Hillary stand for? After all, it is a big news this week and this article is at least the cover story. According to her supporters, she flew nearly a million miles and visited 112 countries. If a foreign crisis occurs on her watch, she will already have been there, read the briefing book and had tea with the local power brokers. No other candidate of either party can boast as much. From this case, we know that she has lots of political capital on the surface at least. She also understands Washington, DC, as well as anyone. Mrs Clinton made a habit of listening to, and working with, senators on both sides of the aisle, leading some Republicans publicly to regret having disliked her in the past. On foreign policy, she says she is neither a realist nor an idealist but an "idealistic realist". Charles Schumer, her former Senate colleague from New York, called her "the most opaque person you'll ever meet in your life". On foreign policy, Mrs Clinton's pitch is that she would be tougher than Mr Obama . Many foreigners would welcome an American commander-in-chief who is genuinely engaged with the world outside America. Sceptics raise two further worries about Mrs Clinton . She used a private server for her e-mails as secretary of state, released only the ones she deemed relevant and then deleted the rest. Some people think she is untrustworthy. The other worry, as Gary Hart said, "We should not be down to two families who are qualified to govern." Will Hillary Clinton win in 2016? This article provides us with too much information about disadvantages about her, although it looks like appreciating Mrs Clinton in some degree. Firstly, as we all know, she has spent years in politics so she make acquaintances with many politicians. But this will let people concentrate on family political instead of the first female president . Obama is America's first black president and the news cheered many people up in the past, but it means nothing. Pr stunt about the first female president may let people be repulsive. Secondly, she does not have clear repulsive. As put above, Mrs Clinton is close to Wall Street, but she is also a power-hungry statist. Giving both sides a stake in change is a good strategy to be a politicians, but to be voted as a president, it means you offend both parties. It has a negative effect on some voters, especially them who are in swing states. They will be puzzled and do not support you. Thirdly, sometimes something is a trend. To a certain extent, maybe she is too old to be a president, just younger than Reagan. As a democratic president, what Mr Obama does is unimpressive. Many foreigners would welcome an American commander-in-chief who is genuinely engaged with the world outside American, but not American people. There are too much unpredictable venture during her way to be president. What happens after that remains to be seen .
个人分类: 每周经济学人评介|19 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 Physical Gold Vs Paper Gold: Waiting For The Dam To Break
insight 2013-4-28 16:39
Physical Gold Vs Paper Gold: Waiting For The Dam To Break Submitted by Tyler Durden on 04/27/2013 13:14 -0400 Australia Bank of England Bear Market Capital Markets Central Banks China Commitment of Traders Eurozone Exchange Traded Fund Guest Post India Investor Sentiment Japan Market Conditions Middle East Moving Averages Precious Metals Switzerland Technical Analysis United Kingdom Submitted by Alasdair Macleod, via GoldMoney.com , Introduction In this article I will argue that the recent slide in the gold price has generated substantial demand for bullion that will likely bring forward a financial and systemic disaster for both central and bullion banks that has been brewing for a long time. To understand why, we must examine their role and motivations in precious metals markets and assess current ownership of physical gold, while putting investor emotion into its proper context. In the West (by which in this article I broadly mean North America and Europe) the financial community treats gold as an investment. However, of the global pool of gold, which GoldMoney estimates to be about 160,000 tonnes, the amount actually held by western investors in portfolios is a very small fraction of this amount. Furthermore investor behaviour, which in itself accounts for just part of the West’s bullion demand, is sharply at odds with the hoarders’ objectives, which is behind underlying tensions in bullion markets. To compound the problem, analysts, whose focus incorporates portfolio investment theories and assumptions, have very little understanding of the economic case for precious metals, being schooled in modern neo-classical economic theories. These economic theories, coupled with modern investment analysis when applied to bullion pricing, have failed to understand the growing human desire for protection from monetary instability. The result has for a considerable time been the suppression of bullion prices in capital markets below their natural level of balance set by supply and demand. Furthermore, the value put on precious metals by hoarders in the West has been less than the value to hoarders in other countries, particularly the growing numbers of savers in Asia. These tensions, if they persist, are bound to contribute to the eventual destruction of paper currencies. The ownership of gold The amount of gold bullion that backs investor-driven markets is not statistically recorded, but we can illustrate its significance relative to total stocks by referring back to the time of the oil crisis of the mid-1970s. In 1974 the global stock of gold was estimated to be half that of today, at about 80,000 tonnes. Monetary gold was about 37,000 tonnes, leaving 43,000 tonnes in the form of non-monetary bullion, coins and jewellery. Let us arbitrarily assume, on the basis of global wealth distribution, that two thirds of this was held by the minority population in the West, amounting to about 30,000 tonnes. This figure probably grew somewhat before the early 1980s, spurred by the bull market and growing fear of inflation, which saw investors buy mainly coins and mining shares. Demand for gold bars was driven by the rapid accumulation of dollars in the oil-exporting nations, as well as some hoarding by wealthy investors from all over the world through Switzerland and London. The sharp rise in global interest rates in the Volcker era, the subsequent decline of the inflation threat and the resulting bear market for gold inevitably led to a reduction of bullion holdings by wealthy investors in the West. Swiss and other private banks, employing a new generation of fund managers and investment advisors trained in modern portfolio theories, started selling their customers’ bullion positions in the 1980s, leaving very little by 2000. In the latter stages of the bear market, jewellery sales in the West became a replacement source of bullion supply, but this was insufficient to compensate for massive portfolio liquidation. So by the year 2000, Western ownership of non-monetary gold suffered the severe attrition of a twenty-year bear market and the reduction of inflation expectations. Portfolios, which routinely had 10-15% exposure to gold 40 years ago even today have virtually no exposure at all. Given that jewellery consumption in Europe and North America was only 400-750 tonnes per annum over the period, by the year 2000 overall gold ownership in the West must have declined significantly from the 1974 guesstimate of 30,000 tonnes. While the total gold stock in 2000 stood at 128,000 tonnes, the virtual elimination of portfolio holdings will have left Western holders with little more than perhaps an accumulation of jewellery, coins and not much else: bar ownership would have been at a very low ebb. Since 2000, demand from countries such as India and more recently China is known to have increased sharply, supporting the thesis that gold has continued to accumulate at an accelerating pace in non-Western hands. Western bullion markets have therefore been on the edge of a physical stock crisis for some time. Much of the West’s physical gold ownership since 2000 has been satisfied by recycling scrap originating in the West, suggesting that total gold ownership in the West today barely rose before the banking crisis despite a tripling of prices. Meanwhile the disparity between demand for gold in the West compared with the rest of the world has continued, while the West’s investment management community has been actively discouraging investment. The result has been that nearly all new mine production and Western central bank supply has been absorbed by non-Western hoarders and their central banks. While post-banking crisis there has presumably been a pick-up in Western hoarding, as evidenced by ETF and coin sales and some institutional involvement, it is dwarfed by demand from other countries. So it is reasonable to conclude that of the total stock of non-monetary gold, very little of it is left in Western hands. And so long as the pressure for migration out of the West’s ownership continues, there will come a point where there is so little gold left that futures and forwards markets cease to operate effectively. That point might have actually arrived, signalled by attempts to smash the price this month. This admittedly broad-brush assessment has important implications for the price stability essential to bullion banks operating in paper markets as well as for central banks attempting to maintain confidence in their paper currencies. Precious metals in capital markets In the West itself, the attitudes of the investment community are fundamentally different from even those of the majority of Western hoarders, who are looking for protection from systemic and currency risks as opposed to investment returns. Western investors are generally oblivious to the implications, the most fundamental of which is that falling prices actually stimulate physical demand. Before the recent dramatic slide in prices the investment community undervalued precious metals compared with Western hoarders, let alone those in Asia, encouraging physical bullion to migrate from financial markets both to firmer hands in the West as well as the bulk of it to non-West ownership. There is now irrefutable evidence that these flows have accelerated significantly on lower prices in recent weeks, as rational price theory would lead one to expect. Pricing bullion is therefore not as simple as the investment community generally believes. It is being put about, mostly on grounds of technical analysis, that the bull markets in gold and silver have ended, and precious metals have entered a new downtrend. The evidence cited is that medium and longer-term moving averages have been violated and are now falling; furthermore important support levels have been breached. These developments, which arise out of the futures and forward markets, have rattled Western investors who thought they were in for an easy ride. However, a close examination of futures trading shows the bearish case even on investment grounds is flawed, as the following two charts of official statistics provided by weakly Commitment of Traders data clearly show. The Money Managers category is the clearest reflection in the official data of investor portfolio positions, representing sizeable mutual and hedge funds. In both cases, the number of long contracts is at historically low levels, and shorts, arguably the better reflection of money-manager sentiment, remain close to high extremes. On this basis, investor sentiment is clearly very bearish already, with the investment management community already committed to falling prices. Put very simplistically there are now more buyers than sellers. Money Managers are in stark opposition to the Commercials, who seek to transfer entrepreneurial risk to Money Managers and other investor and speculator categories. The official statistics break Commercials down into two categories: Producer/Merchant/Processor/User, and Swap Dealers. Both categories include the activities of bullion banks, which in practice supply liquidity to the market. Because investors and speculators tend to run bull positions, bullion banks acting as market-makers will in aggregate always be short. A successful bullion bank trader will seek to make trading profits large enough to compensate for any losses on his net short position that arise from rising prices. A bullion bank trader must avoid carrying large short positions if in his judgement prices are likely to rise. He will be more relaxed about maintaining a bear position in falling markets. Crucially, he must keep these opinions private, and the release of market statistics are designed to accommodate these dealers’ need for secrecy. Bullion banks’ position details are disclosed at the beginning of every month in the Bank Participation Reports, again official statistics. They are broken down into two categories, based on the individual bank’s self-description on the CFTC’s Form 40, into US and Non-US Banks. Their positions are shown in the next two charts (note the time scale is monthly). In both gold and silver, the bullion banks have managed to reduce their exposure from extreme net short over the last four months. The reduction of their market exposure suggests that they have been deliberately transferring this risk to other parties, and is consistent with an anticipation that bullion prices will rise. It is the other side of the high level of bearishness reflected in the Money Manager category shown in the first two charts. The bullion banks control the market; the Money Managers are merely tools of their trade. There has been little reduction in open interest in gold and it has remained strong in silver, because risk has been transferred rather than extinguished. Daily official statistics on open interest are provided by the exchange and summarised in the next two charts (note that data is daily). From these charts it can be seen that recent declines in the gold price are failing to reduce open interest further, and in silver open interest remains stubbornly high. Therefore, attempts by bullion banks to reduce their net short exposure by marking prices down are showing signs of failure. We can therefore conclude that investor sentiment is at bearish extremes and the bullion banks have reduced their net short exposure to levels where it risks rising again. Therefore the downside for precious metals prices appears to be severely limited, contrary to sentiments expressed by technical analysts and in the media. This market position is against a background of a growing shortage of physical bullion, which is our next topic. Physical markets Casual observers of precious metal prices are generally unaware that the headline writers focus on activity in the futures markets and generally ignore developments in physical bullion. This is consistent with the fact that market data is available in the former, while dealing in the latter is secretive. However, as with icebergs, it is not what you see above the water that matters so much as that which is out of sight below. It is not often understood in investment circles that gold and silver are commodities for which the laws of supply and demand are not overridden by investor psychology. Therefore, if the price falls, demand increases. Indeed, the increase in demand has far outweighed selling by nervous investors; even before the price-drop, demand for both silver and gold significantly exceeded supply. Evidence ranges from readily available statistics on record demand for newly-minted gold and silver coins and the net accumulation of gold by non-Western central banks, to trade-based information such as imports and exports of non-monetary gold as well as reports from trade associations reporting demand in diverse countries such as India, China, the UK, US, Japan and even Australia. All this evidence points in the same direction: that physical demand is increasing on every price drop. There is therefore a growing pricing conflict between futures and forward markets, which do not generally involve settlement but the rolling-over of speculative positions, and of the underlying physical metal. Furthermore, analysts make the mistake of looking at gold purely in terms of mining and scrap supply, when nearly all gold ever mined is theoretically available to the market, in the right conditions and at the right price. The other side of this larger coin is that if the price of gold is suppressed by activity in paper markets to below what it would otherwise be, the stimulus for physical demand, being based on a 160,000 tonne market, is likely to be considerably greater on a given price drop than analysts who are myopic beyond 2,750 tonnes of annual mine production might expect. The numbers that are available confirm this to have been the case, particularly over the last few weeks, with reports from all over the world of an unprecedented surge in demand. This is at the root of a developing crisis of which few commentators are as yet aware. Demand for physical has accelerated the transfer of bullion from capital markets to hoarders everywhere and from the West’s capital markets to other countries, which has been the trend since the oil crisis in the mid-Seventies. This is what’s behind an acute shortage of physical gold in capital markets, explaining perhaps why bullion banks feel the need to reduce their short positions. While we can detail their exposure in futures markets, meaningful statistics are not available in over-the-counter forward markets, particularly for London, which dominates this form of trading. Forwards are considerably more flexible than futures as a trading medium, generating trading profits, commissions, fees and collateralised banking business. The ability to run unallocated client accounts, whereby a client’s gold is taken onto a bank’s balance sheet, is in stable market conditions an extremely profitable activity, made more profitable by high operational gearing. The result is that paper forward positions are many multiples of the physical bullion available. The extent of this relationship between physical bullion and paper is not recorded, but judging by the daily turnover in London there is an enormous synthetic short physical position. For this reason a sharply rising price would be catastrophic and any drain on bullion supplies rapidly escalates the risk. Overseeing this market is the Bank of England co-operating with other Western central banks and the Bank for International Settlements, whose combined interest obviously favours price stability. They have been quick to supply the market if needed, confirmed by freely-admitted leasing operations in the past, and by secretive supply into the market, which has been detected by independent supply and demand analysis over the last 15 years. Furthermore, as currency-issuing banks, central banks are unlikely to take kindly to market signals that suggest gold is a better store of value than their own paper money. We can only speculate about day-to-day interventions by Western central banks in gold markets. In this regard it seems that the slide in prices on the 12th and 15th April was triggered by a very large seller of paper gold; if this market story and the amount mentioned are correct, it can only be central bank intervention, acting to deliberately drive prices lower. Given the market position, with Money Managers in the futures markets already short and highly vulnerable to a bear squeeze, the story seems credible. The objective would be to persuade holders of physical ETFs and allocated gold accounts to sell and supply the market, on the assumption that they would behave as investors convinced the bull market is over. Conclusions For the last 40 years gold bullion ownership has been migrating from West to elsewhere, mostly the Middle East and Asia, where it is more valued. The buyers are not investors, but hoarders less complacent about the future for paper currencies than the West’s banking and investment community. There was a shortage of physical metal in the major centres before the recent price fall, which has only become more acute, fully absorbing ETF and other liquidation, which is small in comparison to the demand created by lower prices. If the fall was engineered with the collusion of central banks it has backfired spectacularly. The time when central banks will be unable to continue to manage bullion markets by intervention has probably been brought closer. They will face having to rescue the bullion banks from the crisis of rising gold and silver prices by other means, if only to maintain confidence in paper currencies. Any gold held by struggling eurozone nations, theoretically available to supply markets as a stop-gap, will not last long and may have been already sold. This will likely develop into another financial crisis at the worst possible moment, when central banks are already being forced to flood markets with paper currency to keep interest rates down, banks solvent, and to finance governments’ day-to-day spending. Its importance is that it threatens more than any other of the various crises to destabilise confidence in government-backed currencies, bringing an early end to all attempts to manage the others systemic problems. History might judge April 2013 as the month when through precipitate action in bullion markets Western central banks and the banking community finally began to lose control over all financial markets. 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个人分类: gold|13 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 Fed Forces Primary Dealers To Buy Ever More Short-Dated Paper As Corporate Bond
insight 2012-11-7 16:20
disabled. Fed Forces Primary Dealers To Buy Ever More Short-Dated Paper As Corporate Bond Holdings Drop To Decade Low Submitted by Tyler Durden on 07/09/2012 10:53 -0400 Earlier today, Bloomberg came out with an article titled " Dealers Declining Bernanke Twist Invitation " in which the authors make the claim that "Wall Street banks are increasingly choosing to hoard their U.S. bonds rather than sell them to the Federal Reserve as speculation grows that a slowing economy and global financial turmoil will only make them more dear." As the argument, Bloomberg points out ever lower Bids To Cover in the near-daily sterilized POMOs that the Fed conducts as part of Twist, which actually is a meaningful if very volatile argument and which may be far more impacted by how much money the New York Fed is letting banks skim off the margin in daily POMOs as ZH has discussed previously. More impotantly, BBG notes the record holdings of Treasury bonds by Primary Dealers (something we too did a month ago ). It even goes on to quote 'serious people' - "People are not willing to sell Treasuries" said Thanos Bardas, a managing director in Chicago at Neuberger Berman LLC, which oversees about $89 billion in fixed-income assets, in a June 28 telephone interview. "The data in the U.S. doesn’t look as good. The labor market has lost momentum. There will be more upside left in Treasuries despite the low levels of rates." All this would be correct if it wasn't for one small detail: the distribution of UST holdings within the Dealer inventory. As we have repeatedly shown, once one looks at just what Dealers hold, the story flips diametrically. In fact, according to the most recent Primary Dealer data released by the FBRNY (as of June 27), of the $106 billion in Dealer Treasury holdings, a whopping 78% are in the 3 Years and under category, in other words precisely what the Fed is selling to the Dealers per Twist ! That Dealers are then unable to offload this ZIRPing inventory (because as is well known all paper up until 3 Years has largely negative real rates) actually solidly refutes the story's thesis: Dealers are more than happy to play Twist, but nobody else wants to buy what the Fed sticks Dealers with. Hardly an indication of ravenous demand for US paper. Indeed, what Bloomberg should have done is look at the proportion of paper 3 Years and above historically held by Dealers to get a gauge of just how much demand there is for Treasurys. And at 22%, this is about as good as it has been, especially when one considers the net $10.6 billion short position in 6-11 year paper which is the largest since April 25. What is perhaps most confounding, and what completes the picture, is that as the Fed has forced Dealers to buy up more and more sub-3 year paper, PDs have been forced to find a release valve elsewhere, and sell securities to make room for all this ZIRP paper. That somewhere is corporate bonds, which as the second chart shows, is at $60.9 billion, or the lowest total since May of 2002. One can argue that the Volcker rule is making holding on to corporate paper prohibitive but since Volcker rule is nowhere close to implementation that would be disngenuous. What the PD rotation out of corps and into TSYs certainly does do, however, is to reduce liquidity in the bond market as dealers no longer have cash (non-CDS paper) in stock, pushing bid/asks to the widest they have ever been (as Citi's Stephen Antczak recently explained phenomenally well in the June 1 paper titled Bid Wanted! Coping with Market Illiquidity ). In other words, all that Bloomberg has shown is that as the Fed's Twisting continues, its secondary effects on the market continue to deteriorate an already collapsing liquidity infrastructure, until at the end TSYs will be the only product that has any liquidity left to it, forcing everyone to become a bond trader, and shortly thereafter, vigilante. As an apendix for those curious, here is a summary of all bond sales conducted by the Fed in 2012: total of $274 billion in short-dated paper sold. The Fed sure doesn't seem to be having a problem with any of these sales.
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