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雷达卡
摘要翻译：
流动民主允许选民直接投票替代方案，或将投票权委托给他们信任的人。大多数流动的民主文献和实现允许每个选民每次选举只提名一名代表。但是，如果该代表弃权，分配给她的表决权就没有使用。为了最大限度地减少未使用的代表团数量，有人建议每个选民都应该宣布她信任的选民的个人排名。在本文中，我们表明，即使个人排名超过选民被宣布，流动民主的标准授权方法仍然是有问题的。更具体地说，我们表明，当宣布个人对选民的排名时，接受委托投票权可能是不可取的，这与流动民主的根本依赖背道而驰。为了解决这一问题，我们提出了一种新的选举投票权委托方法，称为广度优先委托。此外，提出的方法优先将投票权分配给与委托投票人密切相关的个人。
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英文标题：
《Incentivising Participation in Liquid Democracy with Breadth-First
Delegation》
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作者：
Grammateia Kotsialou and Luke Riley
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：
一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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一级分类：Computer Science 计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory 计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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英文摘要：
Liquid democracy allows members of an electorate to either directly vote over alternatives, or delegate their voting rights to someone they trust. Most of the liquid democracy literature and implementations allow each voter to nominate only one delegate per election. However, if that delegate abstains, the voting rights assigned to her are left unused. To minimise the number of unused delegations, it has been suggested that each voter should declare a personal ranking over voters she trusts. In this paper, we show that even if personal rankings over voters are declared, the standard delegation method of liquid democracy remains problematic. More specifically, we show that when personal rankings over voters are declared, it could be undesirable to receive delegated voting rights, which is contrary to what liquid democracy fundamentally relies on. To solve this issue, we propose a new method to delegate voting rights in an election, called breadth-first delegation. Additionally, the proposed method prioritises assigning voting rights to individuals closely connected to the voters who delegate.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.03710
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