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摘要翻译：
我们研究了一个代理群体希望通过社区成员的自愿捐款来资助公共项目的机制设计问题。这是一种没有外来预算的公共支出模式，如参与式预算或自愿税收方案，以及在将慈善机构解释为公共项目、将捐款解释为捐款时进行捐助者协调。我们的目的是确定个人捐款的互利分配。在我们研究的偏好聚合问题中，代理人报告项目的线性效用函数以及他们的贡献量，该机制决定了社会最优的货币分配。我们确定了一个特定的机制--纳什乘积规则--它选择使代理效用乘积最大化的分布。该规则是帕累托有效的，我们证明了它满足诱人的激励性质：它只将每个agent的贡献花在agent认为可以接受的项目上，并且agent被强烈激励参与。
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英文标题：
《Funding Public Projects: A Case for the Nash Product Rule》
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作者：
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Dominik Peters,
Christian Stricker, Warut Suksompong
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最新提交年份：
2021
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分类信息：
一级分类：Computer Science 计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory 计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
We study a mechanism design problem where a community of agents wishes to fund public projects via voluntary monetary contributions by the community members. This serves as a model for public expenditure without an exogenously available budget, such as participatory budgeting or voluntary tax programs, as well as donor coordination when interpreting charities as public projects and donations as contributions. Our aim is to identify a mutually beneficial distribution of the individual contributions. In the preference aggregation problem that we study, agents report linear utility functions over projects together with the amount of their contributions, and the mechanism determines a socially optimal distribution of the money. We identify a specific mechanism -- the Nash product rule -- which picks the distribution that maximizes the product of the agents' utilities. This rule is Pareto efficient, and we prove that it satisfies attractive incentive properties: it spends each agent's contribution only on projects the agent finds acceptable, and agents are strongly incentivized to participate.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2005.07997
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