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这本书很漂亮，书也很好，在欧、美、加 都很风行。是学博弈不错的一本书！
Editer:Christian Schmidt is Professor at the University of Paris-Dauphine.
Game Theory and Economic Analysis presents the wide range of current con-tributions of game theory to economics. The chapters fall broadly into twocategories. Some lay out in a jargon-free manner a particular branch of thetheory, the evolution of one of its concepts, or a problem that runs throughits development. Others are original pieces of work that are significant to game theory as a whole.
After taking the reader through a concise history of game theory, the contributors discuss such topics as:
* the connections between Von Neumann’s mathematical game theory and the domain assigned to it today since Nash
* the strategic use of information by game players
* the problem of the coordination of strategic choices between independ-ent players in non-cooperative games
* cooperative games and their place within the literature of games
* incentive and the implementation of a collective decision in game-theoretic modeling
* team games and the implications for firms’ management.
The nature of the subject and the angle from which it is examined will ensure that Game Theory and Economic Analysis reaches a wide readership. As an established scholar in the area of game theory, Christian Schmidt has pro-duced an authoritative book with contributions from economists of the very highest rank and profile, some of them well known beyond the boundaries of
the game-theoretic community.
Introduction
CHRISTIAN SCHMIDT
PART I
Historical insight
1 Von Neumann and Morgenstern in historical perspective
ROBERT W. DIMAND AND MARY ANN DIMAND
2 Rupture versus continuity in game theory: Nash versus Von
Neumann and Morgenstern
CHRISTIAN SCHMIDT
PART II
Theoretical content
3 Blu? and reputation
SYLVAIN SORIN
4 An appraisal of cooperative game theory
HERVé MOULIN
5 The coalition concept in game theory
SéBASTIEN COCHINARD
6 Do Von Neumann and Morgenstern have heterodox followers?
CHRISTIAN SCHMIDT
7 From specularity to temporality in game theory
JEAN-LOUIS RULLIèRE AND BERNARD WALLISER
PART III
Applications
8 Collective choice mechanisms and individual incentives
CLAUDE D’ASPREMONT AND LOUIS-ANDRé GéRARD-VARET
9 Team models as a framework to analyze coordination problems
within the firm
JEAN-PIERRE PONSSARD, SéBASTIEN STEINMETZ, AND
HERVé TANGUY
[此贴子已经被作者于2007-4-5 17:58:32编辑过]
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