英文文献:Optimal Product Variety in a Hotelling Model-霍特林模型中的最优产品品种
英文文献作者:Kieron Meagher
英文文献摘要:
In Hotelling style duopoly location games the product variety (or firm locations) is typically not socially optimal. This occurs because the competitive outcome is driven by the density of consumers at the margin while the socially optimal outcome depends on the whole distribution of consumer locations/tastes. We consider a natural extension of the standard model in which firms are imperfectly informed about the distribution of consumers, in particular firms are uncertain about the consumer mean. In the uniform case, as the aggregate uncertainty about the mean becomes large relative to the dispersion of consumers about the mean, competitive locations become socially optimal. A limit result on prices for discontinuous, log-concave densities shows the result will hold in a range of cases.
在霍特林式的双寡头位置博弈中,产品种类(或企业位置)通常不是社会最优的。这是因为竞争结果是由边缘的消费者密度驱动的,而社会最优结果则取决于消费者地点/品味的整体分布。我们考虑了一个标准模型的自然扩展,在这个模型中,企业不完全了解消费者的分布,特别是企业不确定消费者的均值。在统一的情况下,当总体的不确定性的平均值变得大相对于消费者对平均值的分散,竞争地点成为社会最优。一个关于不连续的、对数凹密度的价格的极限结果表明,这个结果在一定范围内也适用。