英文文献:Corruption, Optimal Taxation and Growth-腐败、最佳税收和增长
英文文献作者:Raul A. Barreto,James Alm
英文文献摘要:
How does the presence of corruption affect the optimal mix between consumption and income taxation? In this paper we examine this issue using a simple neoclassical growth model, with a self-seeking and corrupt public sector. We find that the optimal tax mix in a corrupt economy is one that relies more heavily upon consumption taxes than on income taxes, relative to an economy without corruption. Our model also allows us to investigate the effect of corruption on the optimal size of government, and our results indicate that the optimal size of government balances the wishes of the corrupt public sector for a larger government, and so greater opportunities for corruption, with those in the private sector who prefer a smaller government. Not surprisingly, the optimal size of government is smaller in an economy with corruption than in one without corruption.
腐败的存在如何影响消费和所得税的最优组合?在本文中,我们使用一个简单的新古典主义增长模型来研究这个问题,其中包含了一个自我追求和腐败的公共部门。我们发现,与没有腐败的经济体相比,腐败经济体中最优的税收组合是对消费税的依赖大于对所得税的依赖。模型还允许我们来调查腐败政府的最佳大小的影响,和我们的研究结果表明,政府的最优规模余额腐败的意愿为一个更大的政府公共部门,所以更大的腐败的机会,与私营部门的那些更喜欢小政府。毫无疑问,在有腐败的经济体中,政府的最佳规模要小于没有腐败的经济体。


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