楼主: 风险识别956
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[英文文献] A Contest with the Taxman: The Impact of Tax Rates on Tax Evasion and Waste... [推广有奖]

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风险识别956 发表于 2005-5-21 10:05:14 |AI写论文

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英文文献:A Contest with the Taxman: The Impact of Tax Rates on Tax Evasion and Wastefully Invested Resources-与税务员的竞争:税率对逃税和资源浪费的影响
英文文献作者:Ralph-C Bayer
英文文献摘要:
We develop a moral hazard model with auditing where both the principal and the agent can influence the probability that the true state of nature is verified. This setting is widely applicable for situations where fraudulent reporting with costly state verification takes place. However, we use the framework to investigate tax evasion. We model tax evasion as a concealment-detection contest between the taxpayer and the authority. We show that higher tax rates cause more evasion and increase the resources wasted in the contest. Additionally, we find conditions under which a government should enforce incentive compatible auditing in order to reduce wasted resources.

我们建立了一个包含审计的道德风险模型,在这个模型中,委托人和代理人都可以影响性质真实状态被验证的概率。这一设置广泛适用于发生欺骗性报告和昂贵的国家核查的情况。然而,我们使用这个框架来调查逃税。我们将逃税建模为纳税人与当局之间的一场隐蔽检测竞赛。我们表明,更高的税率导致更多的逃税和增加资源浪费的竞争。此外,我们还发现了政府应在何种条件下实施激励相容审计,以减少资源浪费。
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