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<P>Roland, Gerard. Transition and Economics : Politics, Markets and Firms.<BR>Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press, 2000.</P>
<P>Contents<BR>Acknowledgments Introduction: Transition and Economics xiii<BR>xvii<BR>C H A P T E R 1 Understanding Transition 1<BR>1.1 Little Prior Knowledge before Transition 1<BR>1.2 Surprises of Transition 2<BR>1.3 The Initial Situation before Transition 5<BR>1.4 Objectives and Constraints of Transition 11<BR>1.5 Stylized Facts about Transition 14<BR>1.5.1 Differences in Reform Paths and Strategies 14<BR>1.5.2 Differences in Macroeconomic Performance after<BR>Liberalization 17<BR>1.5.3 Differences in Enterprise Performance in Response to<BR>Changes in Ownership and Corporate Governance 21<BR>1.5.4 Summary 22<BR>P A R T O N E Political Constraints and Reform Strategy 23<BR>C H A P T E R 2 The Politics of Reforms under Uncertainty 25<BR>2.1 The Importance of Political Constraints 25<BR>2.2 Ex Ante and Ex Post Political Constraints 26<BR>2.3 Gradualism and the Interim Status Quo Bias 28<BR>2.4 Aggregate Uncertainty 31<BR>2.4.1 The Trade-offs between Big Bang and Gradualism 31<BR>2.4.2 The Role of Complementarities and Reform Momentum 37<BR>2.4.3 The Role of Reversal Costs 41<BR>2.5 Optimal Sequencing 42<BR>2.5.1 Sequencing of Reforms with Differences in<BR>Expected Outcome 43<BR>2.5.2 Sequencing of Reforms with Differences in Riskiness 44<BR>2.5.3 Sequencing of Reforms with Differences in Constituencies 45</P>
<P>2.5.4 The Possible Trade-off between Ex Ante Acceptability<BR>and Ex Post Irreversibility 47<BR>2.5.5 Exogenous versus Endogenous ?Reelection? or Future<BR>Support and Related Literature 48<BR>2.5.6 Sequencing of Reforms in Transition Economies 48<BR>2.5.7 Other Applications of Reform Sequencing:<BR>European Integration 50<BR>2.6 Speed of Reform and Endogenous Investment 51<BR>2.7 China: The M-Form versus U-Form Organization 56<BR>C H A P T E R 3 Political Constraints without Uncertainty 67<BR>3.1 Efficiency and Compensation of Losers from Reform 67<BR>3.2 No Transfers and Majority Voting 69<BR>3.2.1 Divide-and-Rule Tactics 69<BR>3.2.2 Packaging Reforms to Gain MajoritySupport 72<BR>3.3 Transfers and Asymmetric Information 73<BR>3.4 Secession and transfers 76<BR>3.5 Other Models on Political Constraints and<BR>the Speed of Transition 80<BR>3.6 Some Empirical Literature on Political Constraints 82<BR>3.7 Alternative Approaches to the Political Economy of<BR>Reform 84<BR>C H A P T E R 4 The Political Economyof Mass Privatization 85<BR>4.1 Modeling a Possible Privatization Reversal 87<BR>4.1.1 Privatization Reversal 87<BR>4.1.2 Multiple Equilibria and Critical Mass in Privatization 89<BR>4.1.3 The Political Effect of GiveawayPrivatization 92<BR>4.2 Giveaway to the Population or to Insiders 94<BR>4.3 Thatcherian Underpricing 98<BR>4.4 Empirical Evidence 101<BR>4.5 The Economic Costs of Mass Privatization Programs 102<BR>4.6 Conclusions for Part One </P>
<P>P A R T T W O Allocative Changes 107<BR>C H A P T E R 5 The Optimal Speed of Sectoral Reallocation 109<BR>5.1 Labor Market Frictions 111<BR>5.1.1 The Aghion-Blanchard Model 111<BR>5.2 Endogenous Capital Accumulation 114<BR>5.2.1 The Optimal Speed of Transition 117<BR>5.2.2 Deviations from the Optimal Speed 118<BR>5.3 Related Theoretical Literature 127<BR>5.4 The Empirical Literature on Sectoral<BR>and Labor Reallocation 127<BR>5.5 How Relevant Was the Optimal Speed Debate? 129<BR>C H A P T E R 6 Speed and Methods of Price Liberalization 131<BR>6.1 Pitfalls of Partial Liberalization 133<BR>6.2 Dual-Track Price Liberalization 135<BR>6.2.1 Efficient Supplyand Rationing 137<BR>6.2.2 Inefficient Supplyand Rationing 139<BR>6.2.3 The Plan QuantityGreater Than the Market Quantity 145<BR>6.2.4 Efficiencyand Pareto Improvement under the Dual Track 146<BR>6.2.5 Enforcement of the Dual Track 146<BR>6.2.6 The Dual Track and Corruption 148<BR>6.2.7 The Dual Track beyond Transition 150<BR>6.3 Evidence on the Resistance to Price Liberalization 151<BR>6.4 Evidence on the Allocative Effects of Dual-Track<BR>Liberalization 151<BR>6.5 Conclusion 152<BR>C H A P T E R 7 Liberalization and the Output Fall 153<BR>7.1 The Output Fall in Central and Eastern Europe 153<BR>7.2 Explanations for the Output Fall 154<BR>7.3 Disruption and Bargaining Inefficiency 157<BR>7.4 Search Frictions and Specific Investment 1607.4.1 The Initial Situation under Socialism 160<BR>7.4.2 Conditions for an ?All-Search? Equilibrium 162<BR>7.4.3 Output Dynamics 163<BR>7.4.4 Output Dynamics under Dual-Track Liberalization 166<BR>7.5 Related literature 167<BR>7.6 Empirical Analysis 168<BR>7.7 Conclusion 169<BR>7.8 Appendix 170<BR>C H A P T E R 8 Government Collapse and Economic Performance 171<BR>8.1 Introduction 171<BR>8.2 Government Collapse or Law Enforcement 174<BR>8.2.1 Mafia and Government Protection 174<BR>8.2.2 Crime and Punishment . . . and Taxes 175<BR>8.3 Law Enforcement and Dualism 178<BR>8.4 The EU Accession Effect 180<BR>8.5 The Empirical Literature 184<BR>8.5.1 The Unofficial Economy 185<BR>8.5.2 Corruption 187<BR>8.5.3 Private Contracting under Weak Law Enforcement 189<BR>8.6 Conclusion for Part Two 192</P>
<P><BR>P A R T T H R E E Governance Changes 195<BR>C H A P T E R 9 Solving the Incentive Problems Inherited from Socialism 197<BR>9.1 Government Intervention in Firms 198<BR>9.1.1 Government Control over Firms 199<BR>9.1.2 Privatization 200<BR>9.1.3 Trade-offs in Public and Private Provision of Public Goods 203<BR>9.1.4 Control Rights and Information 204<BR>9.2 The Ratchet Effect 205<BR>9.2.1 The Ratchet Effect under Socialism </P>
<P>9.2.2 The Ratchet Effect and the Managerial Labor Market 209<BR>9.3 The Soft Budget Constraint 213<BR>9.3.1 The Basic Model of Soft Budget Constraints 216<BR>9.3.2 The Soft Budget Constraint and the Ratchet Effect 217<BR>9.3.3 The Lack of Innovation under Socialism 218<BR>9.3.4 Soft Budget Constraints and Shortage 219<BR>9.3.5 Soft Budget Constraints and Enterprise Autonomy 221<BR>9.3.6 Hardening Budget Constraints and Privatization 223<BR>9.3.7 Hardening Budget Constraints through Demonopolization 224<BR>9.4 Some Empirical Literature 224<BR>C H A P T E R 1 0 Comparing Policies of Privatization and Restructuring 229<BR>10.1 The Different Approaches to Privatization 230<BR>10.1.1 The Objectives of Privatization 232<BR>10.1.2 The Constraints Facing Privatization Policies 236<BR>10.1.3 Summarizing the Objectives and Constraints 239<BR>10.1.4 Evaluating Different Privatization Policies 242<BR>10.2 Models of Privatization 250<BR>10.2.1 The Vested Interests of Insider Privatization 250<BR>10.2.2 Better Incentives versus Softer Budget Constraints<BR>and Asset Stripping 252<BR>10.2.3 Privatization with Noncash Bids and Ex Post Moral Hazard 256<BR>10.3 Empirical Evidence 261<BR>C H A P T E R 1 1 Incentives within Government Bureaucracy 265<BR>11.1 Federalism and the Hardening of Budget Constraints 267<BR>11.1.1 Soft Budget Constraints under Centralized Government 268<BR>11.1.2 The Hardening Effect of Fiscal Decentralization 270<BR>11.1.3 Partial Decentralization: Fiscal and MonetaryPolicy 271<BR>11.1.4 Comparative Statics: SOEs versus TVEs 273<BR>11.1.5 Empirical Evidence and Applications 274<BR>11.2 Federalism and Yardstick Competition 276</P>
<P>11.3 Chinese Federalism versus Russia 279<BR>11.4 Understanding Township and Village Enterprises 281<BR>C H A P T E R 1 2 The Soft Budget Constraint and Financial Transition 287<BR>12.1 Dealing with Soft Budget Constraints of Firms 293<BR>12.1.1 Decentralized Banking 295<BR>12.1.2 Trade Arrears and Restructuring with Redeployment 300<BR>12.1.3 Entry 302<BR>12.1.4 Changes in Screening Technology 305<BR>12.2 Dealing with Soft Budget Constraints of Banks 307<BR>12.2.1 Bank Passivityand Gambling for Resurrection 308<BR>12.2.2 Rent Seeking byBanks 312<BR>12.3 Incentives to Reveal Bad Debts 316<BR>12.4 The Empirical Literature 319<BR>12.5 Conclusion to Part Three 322<BR>C H A P T E R 1 3 Synthesizing Lessons from Transition 327<BR>13.1 What Have We Learned about Transition? 328<BR>13.1.1 The Washington Consensus versus the EvolutionaryInstitutionalist<BR>Perspective 328<BR>13.1.2 A Broad Assessment 335<BR>13.2 What Has Economics Learned from Transition? 345<BR>References Author Index Subject Index </P>
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