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英文文献：A Continuous Model of Multilateral Bargaining with Random Arrival Times-随机到达时间的连续多边谈判模型
英文文献作者：Attila Ambrus,Shih En Lu
英文文献摘要：
This paper proposes a continuous-time model framework of bargaining, which is analytically tractable even in complex situations like coalitional bargaining. The main ingredients of the model are: (i) players get to make offers according to a random arrival process; (ii) there is a deadline that ends negotiations. In the case of n-player group bargaining, there is a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, and the share of the surplus a player can expect is proportional to her arrival rate. In general coalitional bargaining, existence and uniqueness of Markov perfect equilibrium is established. In convex games, the set of limit payoffs as the deadline gets infinitely far away exactly corresponds to the core. The limit allocation selected from the core is determined by the relative arrival rates. As an application of the model, legislative bargaining with deadline is investigated.
本文提出了一个连续时间讨价还价的模型框架，该模型在复杂情况下，如联盟讨价还价，也具有解析性。该模型的主要成分是:(i)玩家根据随机到达过程进行报价;(二)有结束谈判的最后期限。在n人群体讨价还价的情况下，存在唯一的子博弈完美纳什均衡，且参与者所能期望的剩余份额与其到达率成正比。在一般的联合谈判中，建立了马尔可夫完美均衡的存在唯一性。在凸对策中，当最后期限无限远时，极限偿付集恰好对应于核心。从核心中选择的极限分配由相对到达率决定。作为该模型的一个应用，本文考察了立法讨价还价的期限问题。
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