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不丹是一个小国，我一点都不了解。我只知道，一个人出让权利，总是有原因的。如果说是为了GNH，那么大可继续上一辈的模式，君权不是被证明很有效率么？记得以前看《民主的起源》，奥尔森犀利的指出，如果国家是渴望长久的匪徒，那么民主的产生必定是匪徒间分赃不匀的后果。是匪徒们自己的内讧，最终导致权力外泄，从而给了民主这一变异以发展的空间。从以上的短文，我们可以看到，所谓的王室统治，其实实权也并不只是落在国王身上，年轻的牛津毕业生需要面对的是掌握经济命脉的王室叔叔们以及其他贵族的利益。也许放权并不是像文章所讲的一样，其压力来自民间，恰恰相反，极有可能，是王室们的互相争斗和妥协使得民主这一提议被接受。在贵族内阁中，起初的控制权必定掌握在实权人物的手里，如果年轻的国王察觉到打消对手从而巩固权力的机会，他会不会和他的邻国，尼泊尔的国王一样收回民主的成命就不得而知了。
以下是转载自经济学家的原文
Happy with their king's absolute rule, most Bhutanese wonder why he is giving them democracy. A minority wonders why it is being left out
在国王的绝对统治下，大多数不丹人都感到幸福，他们搞不清为什么国王要给他们民主，而少数族裔却为自己被冷落而感到困惑
在国王的绝对统治下，大多数不丹人都感到幸福，他们搞不清为什么国王要给他们民主，而少数族裔却为自己被冷落而感到困惑
IF ONE man could have been expected to support the democratic change sweeping Bhutan, a remote and eccentric Himalayan kingdom, it was Kunzang Wangdi. But as the chief election commissioner queued to vote in Thimpu on April 21st, in a practice run for an inaugural[1] election due next year, he looked mildly reluctant.
Could it be that even Mr Wangdi would prefer to remain under the heel of King Jigme Singye Wangchuck, who ruled Bhutan for 34 years before, last December, passing his throne to one of his sons and handing power to the people? （1）“Yes, personally, because you can't have leaders like that from the people,” said Mr Wangdi, absentmindedly acknowledging the bows of queuing commoners. For an official of his rank, this is a stifflegged stoop, with fingers outstretched to midshin.
King Wangchuck—who warrants a special bow, with both hands raking[2] the ground—had an impressive reign. At his accession[3], the average Bhutanese died at 40 after a life of uneased toil. Continuing a modernisation begun by his father, and underwritten by foreign aid, the king oversaw a transformation. Life expectancy for the 700,000 Bhutanese is now 64 years. The economy grew by 12% last year; GDP per person is reckoned to be $1,400—twice that of India. （2） These are remarkable successes for a monarch committed to the pursuit, in his phrasing, of Gross National Happiness—a policy most constructively defined as favouring sustainable development over growth at any cost.
For most Bhutanese, King Wangchuck's imposition of democracy is therefore unwelcome. Only 125,000 people voted in the mock election, around 28% of the total eligible. Most turned out—in the elegant kneelength tunics[4] and fulllength dresses that Bhutanese must wear in public—because they were told the king wished it. Of the four fictitious[5] parties they were asked to choose between, Druk (“Thunder Dragon”) Yellow, which stands for “culture and tradition” and bears the royal colour, won by a landslide[6]. “It's too soon to bring democracy,” said Thinlay Dorjee, a businessman queuing to vote in Thimpu, a capital of finelytiled roofs, monasteries and, by next year, the world's biggest statue, of the Buddha. “We should stay beneath our king who has given us so much.”
In fact, Mr Dorjee will more or less have his wish. Bhutan's modernisation programme is incremental and royally guided. At some point, its people were likely to demand reform. （3）But by controlling the pace of change, King Wangchuck has done better than the discredited King Gyanendra of Nepal, another Himalayan kingdom, whose absolute rule was swept away by protests last year.
Since 1998 Bhutan has been run by a council of royally approved ministers. Laws have been passed by a parliament whose members are either elected, or Buddhist clergy or picked by the king. Even after next year's election, the new king, Jigme Khesar Wangchuck, an Oxfordeducated 27yearold, will control the army and appoint key functionaries[7]. The head of the new (genuine) main party, the People's Democratic Party, is his uncle. The king will be impeachable—with the support of twothirds of an elected parliament—but this is currently unimaginable.
Young King Wangchuck and his clan will also keep a grip on the economy. Two more royal uncles head the country's two biggest conglomerates. Otherwise, the private sector is tiny. Growth is driven by stateowned hydroelectric power generation; the sale of surplus power to India accounts for 87.5% of Bhutan's exports. Last month saw the opening of an Indianfunded 1,020MW power station, more than tripling total generation. Yet this remains a small fraction of Bhutan's hydropower potential, estimated at 30,000MW. “We consider this our black gold,” says Karma Dorjee, the chief official in the trade and commerce ministry.
It is premature to see the Bhutanese as Himalayan versions of the oil rich Gulf Arabs. （4） As India buys more power from Bhutan, it will reduce the massive aid it gives the country, masking the benefit. And with 90% of the population in peasant agriculture, most Bhutanese remain poor. Nonetheless, many are already too pampered by the government—which spends 25% of its budget on health and education—to accept the lowestpaying jobs. To build roads and harvest fields, Bhutan imports up to 100,000 migrant workers from India's poorest northern states. Breaking stones by the road in sullen drudgery[8] for two dollars a day, they are an unhappy contrast with the gailyclad Bhutanese.
Worse, many of the roadbuilders are in fact Bhutanese, though Nepalispeaking and Hindu. Some of this minority—about 20% of the population —launched an insurrection in the 1990s, and all have suffered for it. The violence was partly a response to a racist policy of Bhutanisation, which included forcing Nepalispeakers to wear the Buddhists' costume and prove their right to citizenship by obeying strict rules. （5）As a result, many lost this right. Some 60,000 fled to refugee camps in Nepal, where they languish. Many who stayed—including the relatives of the fugitives, whom the government deems terrorists—are denied citizenship. They are thereby ineligible for government jobs, or suffrage[9].
“It makes me angry,” says Thagi Maya, a roadbuilder, beneath the soaring walls and golden roofs of a 17thcentury fortress in Punaka, a precipitous[10] threehour drive from Thimpu. Ms Maya and her husband were stripped of their rights after her uncle fled to Nepal. Her main hope is that her two children, who are at least permitted schooling, will escape the curse.
注：（沪江chenjilong）
Gross National Happiness (国民幸福总值) ——GNH最早是由不丹王国的国王提出的，他认为政策应该关注幸福，并应以实现幸福为目标。他提出，人生基本的问题是如何在物质生活和精神生活之间保持平衡。在这种执政理念的指导下，不丹创造性地提出了由政府善治、经济增长、文化发展和环境保护四级组成的“国民幸福总值”（GNH）指标。 1970年代不丹提出GNH时并不引人注目，然而20多年的实践已经引起全世界瞩目，世界上不少著名的经济学家把目光投向这个南亚小国，开始认真研究“不丹模式”。美国的世界价值研究机构开始了“幸福指数”研究，英国则创设了“国民发展指数”（MDP），考虑了社会、环境成本和自然资本。日本也开始采用另一种形式的国民幸福总值（GNC），更强调了文化方面的因素。获2002年诺贝尔经济学奖的美国心理学教授卡尔曼和经济学家联手正致力于“国民幸福总值” 的研究。
Gross National Happiness (国民幸福总值) ——GNH最早是由不丹王国的国王提出的，他认为政策应该关注幸福，并应以实现幸福为目标。他提出，人生基本的问题是如何在物质生活和精神生活之间保持平衡。在这种执政理念的指导下，不丹创造性地提出了由政府善治、经济增长、文化发展和环境保护四级组成的“国民幸福总值”（GNH）指标。 1970年代不丹提出GNH时并不引人注目，然而20多年的实践已经引起全世界瞩目，世界上不少著名的经济学家把目光投向这个南亚小国，开始认真研究“不丹模式”。美国的世界价值研究机构开始了“幸福指数”研究，英国则创设了“国民发展指数”（MDP），考虑了社会、环境成本和自然资本。日本也开始采用另一种形式的国民幸福总值（GNC），更强调了文化方面的因素。获2002年诺贝尔经济学奖的美国心理学教授卡尔曼和经济学家联手正致力于“国民幸福总值” 的研究。
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