[英文文献] Brothers in alms ? Coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations... [推广有奖]

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证券728 发表于 2005-6-13 21:54:42 |AI写论文

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英文文献：Brothers in alms ? Coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations-施舍的兄弟?协调非营利组织之间的捐赠市场
英文文献作者：Gani Aldashev,Marco A. Marini,Thierry Verdier
英文文献摘要：
Mission-driven nonprofit organizations compete for donations through fundraising activities. Such competition can lead to inefficient outcomes, if nonprofits impose externalities on each others' output. This paper studies the sustainability of fundraising coordination agreements, using a game-theoretic model of coalition formation. Three key characteristics determine the stability of cooperation: (i) the alliance formation rule, (ii) the extent to which fundraising efforts are strategic complements/substitutes, and (iii) whether deviation from the agreements is by an individual or by a group of nonprofits. We analyze how the interaction between these three features induces (or not) the stability of Pareto-optimal full coordination in fundraising.

使命驱动的非营利组织通过筹款活动来争取捐款。如果非营利组织将外部性强加在彼此的产出上，这样的竞争会导致效率低下的结果。本文运用博弈理论中的联盟形成模型，对筹资协调协议的可持续性进行了研究。三个关键特征决定了合作的稳定性:(i)联盟的形成规则，(ii)筹资努力作为战略补充/替代的程度，以及(iii)是由个人还是非营利组织团体背离协议。本文分析了这三个特征之间的相互作用如何导致(或不)帕累托最优融资完全协调的稳定性。