Springer英文书一章：Moral hazard and equilibrium credit rationing: An overview o

【作者(必填)】 Helmut Bester, Martin Hellwig

【文题(必填)】Moral hazard and equilibrium credit rationing: An overview of the issues

【年份(必填)】 Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives 1987, pp 135-166

【全文链接或数据库名称(选填)】http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-75060-1_9

Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Credit Rationing: An Overview of the Issues

Gunter Bamberg and Klaus Spremann (Eds.)
Agency Theory,
Information,
and Incentives
With Contributions by
W. Ballwieser, G. Bamberg, M. 1. Beckmann, H. Bester
M. Blickle, R. Ewert, G. Feichtinger, V. Firchau, F. Fricke
H. Funke, M. Gaynor, A. Gruber, T. Hartmann-Wendels
M. Hellwig, T. Kaulmann, P. R. Kleindorfer, 1. P. Krahnen
G. Meran, H. Milde, A. Pfingsten, E. Schanze
R. H. Schmidt, D. Schneider, G. Sorger, K. Spremann
P. Swoboda, 1. Voeller, A. Wagenhofer, 1. E. M. Wilhelm
Corrected Reprint of the First Edition
With 37 Figures and 7 Tables
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg New York
London Paris Tokyo Hong Kong

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