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[文献] 感谢 求助文献 急急急! [推广有奖]

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楼主
smile_nana 发表于 2008-3-25 22:16:00 |AI写论文

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<P>文献:Corporate Governance and Over-investment by the U.S. Oil Industry</P>
<P>作者:Sayantani Ghose</P>
<P>时间:November 18, 2005</P>
<P>连接:<SPAN class=a><FONT color=#008000>troi.cc.rochester.edu/~sgos/<B>oil</B>_paper_7.pdf </FONT></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN class=a><FONT color=#008000>这篇文章对我的论文很重要,我引用了其中的部分内容,在写参考文献时,怎么也找不到出处。</FONT></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN class=a><FONT color=#008000>请大家帮忙找一下&nbsp;文章 出处 卷数&nbsp; 页码</FONT></SPAN></P>
<P><SPAN class=a><FONT color=#008000>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 十分感谢。</FONT></SPAN></P>&nbsp; [em06]&nbsp; [em06]
<P align=right><FONT color=#000066>[此贴子已经被作者于2008-3-25 23:28:34编辑过]</FONT></P>
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关键词:求助文献 Governance Investment Corporate investmen 文献 感谢

沙发
cham430072 发表于 2008-3-25 22:46:00
<p>就是这个……</p><p></p><br/>

[此贴子已经被作者于2008-3-25 22:49:23编辑过]

附件: 你需要登录才可以下载或查看附件。没有帐号?我要注册

藤椅
cham430072 发表于 2008-3-25 22:48:00
<p>这个是一篇工作论文。</p>

板凳
cham430072 发表于 2008-3-25 22:50:00
<a href="http://troi.cc.rochester.edu/~sgos/research.html">http://troi.cc.rochester.edu/~sgos/research.html</a>

报纸
cham430072 发表于 2008-3-25 22:50:00
<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">1. <a href="http://troi.cc.rochester.edu/~sgos/oil_paper_7.pdf"><font color="#065c8a">Investor Protection and Over-investment in the U.S. Oil Industry</font></a> (Job Market Paper, 2005)<p></p></b></p><p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="TEXT-ALIGN: justify;">This paper analyzes patterns of investment, profitability and executive compensation when firms experience unexpected cash shortages or windfalls. It links the variation in these patterns of firm behavior to the level of investor protection. For the paper a model is developed that explains the trade-off between risk and incentives in managerial compensation in the presence of weak governance and investment distortions. The U.S. Oil Industry offers a natural environment to test the model implications because big unexpected swings in prices have generated large unanticipated changes in cash flows. In these episodes I isolate and highlight the role of corporate governance on firm decisions. The main empirical results on investment indicate that: (1) there is over-investment, and the level of over-investment is directly proportional to the available cash. The empirical results on CEO compensation contracts indicate that they are written to restrict over-investment. Data reveal that: (1) changes in cash flows are translated positively to CEO compensation; (2) higher investor protection weakens the positive co-movement of available cash and CEO compensation. </p>

地板
smile_nana 发表于 2008-3-25 23:27:00
<p>感谢 感谢</p>

7
gjwmat 发表于 2008-3-30 23:42:00
多谢应助,已加分!

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