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OECD-次贷危机损失研究-080000(pages 25)  关闭 [推广有奖]

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OECD-次贷危机损失研究-080000(pages 25) 240872.pdf (576.75 KB, 需要: 2 个论坛币)


Executive Summary

 The main focus of this study is to review where we now stand in relation to our September 2007 calculation that the losses from subprime could amount to $300bn; what the losses mean for deleveraging in the economy; and what policy options there are to deal with the negative economic consequences of deleveraging.
 Section I of the paper looks at losses calculated with market price methods (the basis of the 2007 work). Liquidity problems and panic are causing major problems for price discovery, rendering this type of approach invalid. Section II therefore looks at default-model based estimates of losses. The point estimate on a default-model basis developed here is $422bn, assuming 40% recovery on defaulting loans and an economic and house price scenario benchmarked against previous episodes. To get anything like recent mark-to-market losses (of virtually double our estimate) would require a 0% recovery rate—which seems extreme even for the most bearish. Section III focuses on the commercial banking share of the losses and potential transmission through deleveraging by this key sector to the economy, as well as policy options to counter this. About $60bn of direct losses may be put down to US commercial banks. 4 things can happen: (i) commercial bank deleveraging, causing a credit crunch; (ii) banks can earn back the capital (with help from interest rate and dividend policy) and get back to intermediating; (iii) capital can be injected by investors (e.g. sovereign wealth funds and hedge funds); and (iv) public sector intervention can be used to separate problem bonds and mortgages from the intermediation process. It could take at least 6 months (with maximal interest rate and dividend cutting) and possibly up to 2 years (with more pessimistic assumptions on rates and dividends).This is too long for the economy, and risks early 1990s credit crunch scenarios. Capital raisings/injections from risk-taking private institutions or SWF‟s are a big help. But the arithmetic of getting quickly back to "business-as-usual", which requires much more capital than simply offsetting the losses, argues for more action if possible. One such action mentioned in this context is the socialisation of losses. The paper provides a low cost example of an "RTC-like" mechanism

 Section IV looks at US-listed prime brokers/investment banks. Direct holding losses could be around $27bn (warehousing, etc). They are less capitalised and problems for the economy arise through their linkages to other sectors, particularly hedge funds.1
 Moral hazard issues arising from actions taken to date underline that the private sector should be encouraged to do the maximum of which it is capable. These are considered in Section V. Even so, the perceptions that the trade-off between returns-to-risk is now asymmetric must be addressed in the future, and may require more fundamental financial system reforms.
 Section VI of the paper draws attention to issues for Europe, but does not analyse them. Europe is not immune from the issues raised, and has its own special set of potential problems. It also risks real economy consequences from the subprime crisis. Section VII draws attention to Asia, where direct subprime holdings are relatively less. In Asia, orderly unwinding of bubbles and avoidance of future problems turn on attitudes to exchange rate policy.
 Section VIII looks at spill-over risks to corporate bonds and equities. While corporate balance sheets are in good shape on average, there is a fat tail of overleveraged companies that will default in the advent of a recession, creating pockets of turmoil in corporate bonds (non-investment grade) and equities. Avoiding such spill over from the mortgage sector is essential, and underlines why a broad approach to policy to minimise the size of the economic impact is required.
 The macro policies options are summarized in section IX: liquidity support and rate cutting to enhance earnings power of banks; focus on dividend policies; capital injections and M&A from stronger financial institutions; and RTC-like socialisation of losses.

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关键词:pages page 次贷危机 OECD Ages 研究 危机 损失 pages OECD

David Gong——千人计划基金/davidgong@163.com
atomcell 发表于 2008-8-28 10:05:00 |显示全部楼层 |坛友微信交流群

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