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[英文文献] China's export registration in the automobile industry: Effects on manufact... [推广有奖]

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信用浙江622 发表于 2005-7-28 15:16:58 |AI写论文

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英文文献:China's export registration in the automobile industry: Effects on manufacturer-intermediary match efficiency-我国汽车行业出口注册:对制造商-中介匹配效率的影响
英文文献作者:Sun, Xiaonan
英文文献摘要:
In 2007, China implemented a policy requiring automobile producers to distribute through at most three trade intermediaries and list their intermediaries on a registry. Motivated by the registration requirements and granularity in the order sizes handled by most intermediaries, this paper develops a model to describe the matches between automakers and intermediaries.The model shows market division arises endogenously due to the regulation. It creates inefficiencies in matching and double marginalization. The model predictions coincide with a number of stylized facts: a strong decline in the number of auto intermediaries, assortative matching, export price increases for intermediaries, and substantial churning in the sets of intermediaries registered by the automakers. Welfare analysis in terms of total profit shows that this regulation benefits automakers, especially those relatively less efficient ones while intermediaries are made worse off.

2007年,中国实施了一项政策,要求汽车生产商通过最多三个贸易中介机构进行分销,并将其中间商登记注册。基于注册要求和大多数中介处理的订单粒度,本文开发了一个模型来描述汽车制造商和中介之间的匹配。该模型表明,由于管制的内在作用,市场分工产生了。它造成匹配效率低下和双重边缘化。模型的预测与许多程式化的事实相吻合:汽车中介机构的数量大幅下降,协调性匹配,中介机构的出口价格上涨,以及汽车制造商注册的中介机构的大量混乱。从总利润角度进行的福利分析表明,这一规定有利于汽车制造商,尤其是那些效率相对较低的汽车制造商,而中间商的情况则更糟。
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