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Gita Gopinath is a Professor of Economics at Harvard University. Her research focuses on International Finance and Macroeconomics. She is a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, a Managing Editor of the Review of Economic Studies, and a research associate with the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) for the programs in Economic Fluctuations and Growth, International Finance and Macroeconomics, and Monetary Economics. She also served as a member of the Eminent Persons Advisory Group on G-20 Matters for India's Ministry of Finance. In 2011, she was chosen as a Young Global Leader by the World Economic Forum. Before coming to Harvard, she was an assistant professor of economics at the University of Chicago's Graduate School of Business. She holds a B.A. from the University of Delhi (1992), an M.A. from the Delhi School of Economics (1994) and from the University of Washington (1996), and a Ph.D from Princeton University (2001).
Abstract
We study scal and monetary policy in a monetary union with the potential for rollover crises in sovereign debt markets. Member-country scal authorities lack commitment to repay their debt and choose scal policy independently. A common monetary authority chooses in ation for the union, also without commitment. We first describe the existence of a scal externality that arises in the presence of limited commitment and leads countries to over borrow; this externality rationalizes the imposition of debt ceilings in a monetary union. We then investigate the impact of the composition of debt in a monetary union, that is the fraction of high-debt versus low-debt members, on the occurrence of self-ful lling debt crises. We demonstrate that a high-debt country may be less vulnerable to crises and have higher welfare when it belongs to a union with an intermediate mix of high- and low-debt members, than one where all other members are low-debt. This contrasts with the conventional wisdom that all countries should prefer a union with low-debt members, as such a union can credibly deliver low in ation. These ndings shed new light on the criteria for an optimal currency area in the presence of rollover crises.
Coordination and Crisis in Monetary Unions.pdf
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