[求助]Bargaining with Reputation

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Please help me to solve this question, xiexie... in a hurry!!!

Consider a two round bargaining game over a pie of size 1, in which Player1 makes the first offer. If 2 rejects, 2 makes a counteroffer. If 1 does not accept the counteroffer, the game ends with neither player receiving anything. Assume that both players have common discount factor=3/4 and are risk neutral. Suppose that there are two behavioral types of player 1. They demand 0.75 and 0.5 respectively, accept offers equal to or greater than their respective demands, and reject lower offers. Each type has prior probability 0.1. With residual probability player 1 is normal. Player 2 is normal with probability 1. Derive a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game.

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关键词：Bargaining Reputation Gaining bargain ATION Bargaining Reputation