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雷达卡
Authors: Michael Tröge
Competition in credit markets is different from competition in simple product markets. The allocation of capital is not only determined by its price, but banks actively decide to whom they will provide finance. In addition, the provision of credit is not a spot transaction, but extends over a certain period of time. Banks need to acquire information in order to efficiently screen borrowers before providing credit and to monitor them during the credit relationship to make sure that the credit will be paid back.
Michael Tröge develops game-theoretic and auction-theoretic models for the strategic interaction of banks in the credit market. He shows that in narrow oligopolies only one bank will carry out detailed creditworthyness tests for a firm and that in very competitive markets information about a borrower′s quality can reduce a bank′s profit. The author also points out that equity ownership of a bank increases the expected interest rates for a firm and that a bank′s concern for a good reputation may lead to credit rationing.
Table of contents
Front Matter
Introduction
Information acquisition in credit auctions
Open bid auctions
Equity ownership of banks
Usury and Credit Rationing
Back Matter
Competition in Credit Markets_A theoretic analysis.pdf
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