发帖
雷达卡
Michael C. Jensen
Harvard Business School
This paper integrates elements from the theory of agency, the theory of property rights and the
theory of finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm. We define the concept
of agency costs, show its relationship to the ‘separation and control’ issue, investigate the nature
of the agency costs generated by the existence of debt and outside equity, demonstrate who bears
costs and why, and investigate the Pareto optimality of their existence. We also provide a new
definition of the firm, and show how our analysis of the factors influencing the creation and
issuance of debt and equity claims is a special case of the supply side of the completeness of
markets problem.
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