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英文文献：Enforcing 'Self-Enforcing' International Environmental Agreements-执行“自我执行”的国际环境协议
英文文献作者：McEvoy, David M.,Stranlund, John K.
英文文献摘要：
Theoretical analyses of international environmental agreements (IEAs) have typically employed the concept of self-enforcing agreements to predict the number of parties to such an agreement. The term self-enforcing, however, is a bit misleading. The concept refers to the stability of cooperative agreements, not to enforcing these agreements once they are in place. Most analyses of IEAs simply ignore the issue of enforcing compliance. In this paper we analyze a static IEA game in which parties to an agreement finance an independent enforcement body with the power to monitor the parties' compliance to the terms of an IEA and impose penalties in cases of noncompliance. This approach is broadly consistent with the enforcement mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol under the Marrakesh Accords. We find that costly enforcement limits the circumstances under which international cooperation to protect the environment is worthwhile, but when IEAs are expected to form they will involve greater participation than IEAs that do not require costly enforcement. Consequently, costly enforcement of IEAs is associated with higher international environmental quality. Moreover, under certain conditions, aggregate welfare is higher when IEAs require costly enforcement.
国际环境协定的理论分析通常采用自我执行协定的概念来预测这种协定的缔约方数目。然而，“自我强制”这个词有点误导人。这个概念指的是合作协定的稳定性，而不是一旦这些协定生效就强制执行。大多数对IEAs的分析简单地忽略了强制执行的问题。在本文中，我们分析了一个静态的国际能源机构博弈，其中协议各方为一个独立的执行机构提供资金，该机构有权监督各方遵守国际能源机构条款的情况，并对不遵守条款的各方进行处罚。这一做法与《马拉喀什协定》下的《京都议定书》的执行机制大体一致。我们发现，代价高昂的执行限制了值得进行国际合作以保护环境的情况，但是，当预期国际援助组织的形成时，它们将比不需要代价高昂的执行的国际援助组织有更多的参与。因此，国际环境援助的昂贵执行与较高的国际环境质量有关。此外，在某些情况下，当国际就业援助需要代价高昂的执行时，总福利会更高。
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