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英文文献：Health Insurance and Competition in Health Care Markets-医疗保险和医疗市场的竞争
英文文献作者：Gilad Sorek
英文文献摘要：
I study duopolistic market for differentiated medical products. Medical providers decide whether to sell on the spot market to sick consumers or to sell through competitive insurance market to healthy consumers. While shopping for insurance consumers know only the distribution of possible medical needs they may have if they get sick. Only when getting sick their actual medical need reveals and diagnosed. Hence consumers on the insurance market have lower taste differentiation than the sick consumers who are shopping on the spot market. I find that in equilibrium providers sell only on the insurance market, even though this intensifies competition because of lower taste differentiation. Competition between providers under insurance sales brings premiums low enough to motivate consumers buying insurance for both products. Insurance sales generate efficient horizontal product differentiation, lower prices, and efficiently higher quality.
我研究了差异化医疗产品的双寡头市场。医疗供应商决定是在现货市场上向生病的消费者销售还是通过竞争激烈的保险市场向健康的消费者销售。在购买保险时，消费者只知道他们生病时可能有哪些医疗需求。只有在生病时，他们实际的医疗需求才会显露出来并得到诊断。因此，保险市场上的消费者与在现货市场购物的患病消费者相比，品位差异更低。我发现，均衡供应商只在保险市场上销售，尽管这加剧了竞争，因为口味差异较低。保险销售下供应商之间的竞争使得保费低到足以刺激消费者为两种产品购买保险。保险销售产生高效的横向产品差异化，降低价格，高效提高质量。
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