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英文文献：Ties that Bind: The Kin System as a Mechanism of Income-Hiding between Spouses in Rural Ghana-捆绑的纽带:在加纳农村，亲属制度作为配偶之间隐藏收入的机制
英文文献作者：Castilla, Carolina
英文文献摘要：
I present a simple model of intra-household allocation between spouses to show that when the quantity of resources available to the household is not perfectly observed by both spouses, hiding of income can occur even when revelation of the additional resources increases bargaining power. From the model, a test to identify income hiding empirically is derived. For the empirical application, a household survey conducted in Southern Ghana is used. I exploit the variation in the degree of asymmetric information between spouses, measured as the difference between the husband’s own reporting of farm sales and the wife’s reporting of his farm sales, to test whether the allocation of resources is consistent with hiding. For identification, the wife’s clan and the husband’s bride-wealth payments upon marriage are used as instruments for asymmetric information. My findings indicate that allocations are suggestive of men hiding farm sales income in the form of gifts to extended family members, which are not closely monitored. It is unclear whether hiding has negative consequences in the long run because hiding occurs in the form of gifts, instead of expenditure in alcohol or tobacco. If the gifts represent a form of risk-sharing, then these gifts will return to the household in the future, and hiding is not necessarily inefficient. However, if these gifts are motivated by social pressure then hiding can result on poverty traps caused by kin system. The wife’s response is also suggestive of hiding. As information asymmetries increase, she reduces her expenditure in non-essential items, such as prepared foods and oil, but increases personal spending. Expenditure in oil is one of the main sources of calories among poor households in the region.
我提出了一个简单的家庭内配偶分配模型来表明，当家庭可用资源的数量没有被双方完美地观察到时，即使当额外资源的披露增加了讨价还价的能力，收入的隐藏也会发生。从模型中，我们得到了一个识别收入隐藏的实证检验。在实证应用方面，使用了在加纳南部进行的一项家庭调查。我利用夫妻之间信息不对称程度的差异(用丈夫自己的农场销售报告和妻子的农场销售报告的差异来衡量)来测试资源的分配是否与隐藏一致。在身份鉴定中，妻子的宗族和丈夫的结婚聘金被用作不对称信息的工具。我的研究结果表明，这种分配暗示着，男性会将农场销售收入以礼物的形式隐藏起来，送给大家族成员，而这并没有受到密切监控。从长远来看，隐藏行为是否会带来负面影响还不清楚，因为隐藏行为是以礼物的形式出现的，而不是烟酒。如果这些礼物代表了一种风险分担的形式，那么这些礼物将在未来回到家庭，而隐藏未必是低效的。但是，如果这些礼物是由社会压力驱动的，那么隐藏可能会导致亲属制度造成的贫困陷阱。妻子的反应也暗示着隐藏。随着信息不对称的加剧，她减少了在非必需品上的支出，比如熟食和食用油，但却增加了个人支出。石油支出是该地区贫困家庭卡路里的主要来源之一。
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