英文文献:Background Risk and Insurance Take-up under Limited Liability-有限责任下的风险和保险业务
英文文献作者:Gilad Sorek,T. Randolph Beard
英文文献摘要:
We study the effect of a non-insurable background risk (BGR) on insurance take-up choices over insurable risks made by risk-averse agents under limited liability laws. This economic environment applies, for example, to the consumer’s decision to purchase medical insurance in the face of non-insurable income risk under limited liability provided by bankruptcy. We consider two types of BGR - a wealth deteriorating risk and a mean-preserving risk. We show that the magnitude of both BGR types has a non-monotonic effect on the rate of uninsured consumers. This is in contrast with the standard monotonic effect of background risk on the demand for insurance, obtained for risk-averse agents under full liability.
我们研究了在有限责任法律下,非保险背景风险(BGR)对风险厌恶者对可保风险的投保选择的影响。例如,这种经济环境适用于面对破产所提供的有限责任下的不可保收入风险时消费者购买医疗保险的决定。我们考虑了两种类型的BGR -财富恶化风险和均值保护风险。我们发现两种BGR类型的大小对无保险消费者比率都有非单调的影响。这与背景风险对保险需求的标准单调效应形成对比,在全责任情况下,风险厌恶代理人得到的结果。


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