麦哲学术：Management Science（管理科学）2019年12月刊论文摘要汇编

是 否 +2 论坛币

k人 参与回答

经管之家送您一份

应届毕业生专属福利!

求职就业群

赵安豆老师微信：zhaoandou666

经管之家联合CDA

送您一个全额奖学金名额~ !

立即领取

感谢您参与论坛问题回答

经管之家送您两个论坛币！

+2 论坛币

本文转编于微信公众号：麦哲学术

获取更多管理学权威期刊学术前沿，请关注我们！

1.  机器翻译会影响国际贸易吗？大型数字平台的证据

DoesMachine Translation Affect International Trade? Evidence from a Large DigitalPlatform

作者：Erik Brynjolfsson , Xiang Hui , Meng Liu

人工智能（AI）在越来越多的领域中已经超越了人类的表现。 但是，对其经济影响的证据有限。 使用来自数字平台的数据，我们研究了AI的关键应用：机器翻译。 我们发现，引入新的机器翻译系统已大大增加了该平台上的国际贸易，使出口增长了10.9％。 此外，异质处理效果与翻译成本的大幅降低是一致的。我们的结果提供了因果证据，表明语言障碍严重阻碍了贸易，并且人工智能已经开始提高至少一个领域的经济效率。

Artificialintelligence (AI) is surpassing human performance in a growing number ofdomains. However, there is limited evidence of its economic effects. Using datafrom a digital platform, we study a key application of AI: machine translation.We find that the introduction of a new machine translation system has significantlyincreased international trade on this platform, increasing exports by 10.9%.Furthermore, heterogeneous treatment effects are consistent with a substantialreduction in translation costs. Our results provide causal evidence thatlanguage barriers significantly hinder trade and that AI has already begun toimprove economic efficiency in at least one domain.

2.  专利巨魔：来自目标公司的证据

PatentTrolls: Evidence from Targeted Firms

作者：Lauren Cohen , Umit G. Gurun , Scott Duke Kominers

我们提供了有关非执业实体（NPE）在知识产权领域的行为和影响的首个大样本证据。我们发现，平均而言，NPE似乎表现为机会主义的“专利巨魔”。NPE起诉现金充裕的公司，将与涉嫌侵权无关的业务领域中的现金作为目标，其频率与针对涉嫌侵权相关的领域中的现金作为目标的频率基本相同。相比之下，现金既不是实践实体（例如IBM和Intel）进行知识产权诉讼的主要驱动力，也不是针对公司的任何其他类型的诉讼。我们发现NPE机会主义的进一步暗示性证据：针对那些捍卫自己的能力下降，重复主张低质量专利的企业，日益临近专利到期的主张活动以及论坛购物的公司。此外，我们发现，NPE诉讼对目标公司的创新产生了真正的负面影响：与NPE达成和解（或在法庭上败给他们）后，公司会大大减少其创新活动。同时，我们没有发现任何明显的NPE传递给最终创新者的标志，也没有发现NPE对最普遍的行业创新的积极影响。

We providethe first large-sample evidence on the behavior and impact of nonpracticingentities (NPEs) in the intellectual property space. We find that, on average,NPEs appear to behave as opportunistic “patent trolls.” NPEs sue cash-richfirms and target cash in business segments unrelated to alleged infringement atessentially the same frequency as they target cash in segments related to allegedinfringement. By contrast, cash is neither a key driver of intellectualproperty lawsuits by practicing entities (e.g., IBM and Intel) nor of any othertype of litigation against firms. We find further suggestive evidence of NPEopportunism: targeting of firms that have reduced ability to defend themselves,repeated assertions of lower-quality patents, increased assertion activitynearing patent expiration, and forum shopping. We find, moreover, that NPElitigation has a real negative impact on innovation at targeted firms: firmssubstantially reduce their innovative activity after settling with NPEs (orlosing to them in court). Meanwhile, we neither find any markers of significantNPE pass-through to end innovators, nor of a positive impact of NPEs on innovationin the industries in which they are most prevalent.

3.  企业社会责任的同行效应

PeerEffects of Corporate Social Responsibility

作者：Jie Cao , Hao Liang , Xintong Zhan

我们使用回归不连续性设计方法研究企业如何响应产品市场同行对企业社会责任（CSR）的承诺和采纳。依靠在股东大会上以微小的票数通过或失败CSR提案，我们发现通过了一项呼声很高的CSR提案，并在其实施之后被同行公司采用了类似的CSR做法。 此外，在企业社会责任方面难以赶上有投票权的公司的同龄人经历的股票收益显着降低，这与采用企业社会责任的溢出效应是对竞争威胁的战略反应这一观点相一致。通过使用对等方的替代定义并检查潜在机制，我们进一步排除了替代解释，例如基于金融中介机构传播的解释。

AbstractWeinvestigate how firms react to their product-market peers’ commitment to andadoption of corporate social responsibility (CSR) using a regressiondiscontinuity design approach. Relying on the passage or failure of CSRproposals by a narrow margin of votes during shareholder meetings, we find thepassage of a close-call CSR proposal and its implementation are followed by theadoption of similar CSR practices by peer firms. In addition, peers that havegreater difficulty in catching up with the voting firm in CSR experiencesignificantly lower stock returns around the passage, consistent with thenotion that the spillover effect of the adoption of CSR is a strategic responseto competitive threat. Using alternative definitions of peers and examiningunderlying mechanisms, we further rule out alternative explanations, such asthat based on propagation by financial intermediaries.

4.  供应中断和最佳网络结构

SupplyDisruptions and Optimal Network Structures

作者：Kostas Bimpikis , Ozan Candogan , Shayan Ehsani

本文研究存在中断风险的多层供应链网络。企业决定从上游供应商那里采购多少，以使其预期利润最大化，并确定中间产品的价格，以使市场畅通。我们对（预期）均衡利润进行了明确的描述，这使我们能够洞悉网络结构（即，每一层的公司数量，生产成本和破坏风险）如何影响公司的利润。此外，我们建立了在生产过程的不同阶段运营的公司（即上游供应商和下游零售商）使利润最大化的网络在结构上有所不同。特别是，后者的下游层次相对较少，并且产生的可变产出要比前者更多。最后，我们考虑内生形成的供应链。具体而言，我们研究了一种环境，在这种环境中，企业通过考虑（预期的）入职后利润来决定是否从事生产。我们认为，内生进入可能导致链条的生产效率低下。

This paperstudies multitier supply chain networks in the presence of disruption risk.Firms decide how much to source from their upstream suppliers so as to maximizetheir expected profits, and prices of intermediate goods are set so thatmarkets clear. We provide an explicit characterization of (expected)equilibrium profits, which allows us to derive insights into how the networkstructure—that is, the number of firms in each tier, production costs, anddisruption risk—affect firms’ profits. Furthermore, we establish that networksthat maximize profits for firms that operate in different stages of theproduction process—that is, for upstream suppliers and downstream retailers—arestructurally different. In particular, the latter have relatively lessdiversified downstream tiers and generate more variable output than the former.Finally, we consider supply chains that are formed endogenously. Specifically,we study a setting where firms decide whether to engage in production byconsidering their (expected) postentry profits. We argue that endogenous entrymay lead to chains that are inefficient in terms of the number of firms thatengage in production.

5.  投资组合经理的所有权和共同基金的承担风险

PortfolioManager Ownership and Mutual Fund Risk Taking

作者：Linlin Ma , Yuehua Tang

本文研究了投资组合经理的所有权（即“游戏中的皮肤”）对共同基金风险承担的影响。通过使用基于持股的风险变化衡量方法来捕获管理者的事前风险选择，我们发现投资组合经理的所有权减少了年内和跨年度的冒险活动。在具有高机构问题引起的冒险冒险动机的管理者中，所有权和降低风险之间的关系尤其牢固，例如，面对更为凸现的流动绩效关系，过往绩效不佳或因长期任职而无法获得报酬的经理定期基金业绩。 具有更高管理所有权的基金也与较低的总风险和下行风险相关联。 总体而言，投资组合经理的所有权是一种激励调整机制，对共同基金投资者具有重要意义。

This paperstudies the effect of portfolio manager ownership (i.e., “skin in the game”) onmutual fund risk taking. Using holdings-based risk change measures that capturemanagers’ ex ante risk choices, we find that portfolio manager ownershipreduces both intrayear and across-year risk-taking activities. The relationshipbetween ownership and risk reduction is particularly strong among managers withhigh agency issue–induced risk-taking incentives—for example, managers who facea more convex flow-performance relationship, have poor past performance, or arenot compensated based on long-term fund performance. Funds with greatermanagerial ownership are also associated with lower levels of total risk anddownside risk. Overall, portfolio manager ownership serves as an incentivealignment mechanism and has important implications for mutual fund investors.

6.  战略客户面对静态价格对收益管理的有效性

Onthe Efficacy of Static Prices for Revenue Management in the Face of StrategicCustomers

作者：Yiwei Chen , Vivek F. Farias , Nikolaos Trichakis

我们考虑一个规范的收益管理（RM）问题，其中垄断者将固定价格范围内要出售的多种产品的价格过高，以使预期收益最大化。产品与众不同，并受联合产能限制。到来的客户具有前瞻性，并根据购买时机制定策略，这是现代客户行为的经验证明。如果客户是近视眼，则基础工作已经确定，在库存和需求大量增长的情况下，静态价格对于该问题渐近最优。与之形成鲜明对比的是，对于客户具有前瞻性的情况，机制设计和动态定价中的可用结果表明处方更为复杂。值得注意的是，这些结果仅适用于仅具有一种产品类型的设置，并且通常还受到对客户类型的限制性假设的约束。我们证明，面对具有多种产品设置和多种客户效用模型的战略客户，静态价格令人惊讶地保持渐近最优。对于单一产品的情况，我们进一步表明，最优定价固定价格可以保证卖方的收入至少在最优动态定价策略下的收入的63.2％以内，而与制度无关。对于我们所考虑的类别之外的实用新型，我们证明了静态价格不一定是渐近最优的。但是，我们认为的客户效用模型类别是简约的，具有经验支持，并且在现有机制设计研究中包含了许多针对此问题考虑的模型。我们考虑了多种类型的客户，并允许客户不再等待与其价值呈正相关的无用功。因此，我们的发现很可能是可靠的，并为典型的RM问题提供了一个简单的处方，该处方在广泛的建模假设中几乎是最优的。

We considera canonical revenue management (RM) problem wherein a monopolist seller postsprices for multiple products that are for sale over a fixed horizon so as tomaximize expected revenues. Products are differentiated and subject to jointcapacity constraints. Arriving customers are forward looking and strategize onthe timing of their purchase, an empirically confirmed aspect of moderncustomer behavior. In the event that customers were myopic, foundational workhas established that static prices are asymptotically optimal for this problemin the regime where inventory and demand grow large. In stark contrast, for thecase where customers are forward looking, available results in mechanism designand dynamic pricing suggest substantially more complicated prescriptions.Notably, these results apply to settings with merely a single product type, andthey are also often constrained by restrictive assumptions on customer type. Wedemonstrate that static prices surprisingly remain asymptotically optimal inthe face of strategic customers for a multiproduct setting and for a broadclass of customer utility models. For the single-product case, we further showthat an optimally set static price guarantees the seller revenues that arewithin at least 63.2% of that under an optimal dynamic pricing policy,irrespective of regime. For utility models outside the class we consider, weshow that static prices need not be asymptotically optimal. Nevertheless, theclass of customer utility models we consider is parsimonious, enjoys empiricalsupport, and subsumes many of the models considered for this problem inexisting mechanism design research. We allow for multidimensional customertypes and for a customer’s disutility from waiting to be positively correlatedwith his valuation. Therefore, our findings are likely to be robust and providefor a canonical RM problem a simple prescription that is near-optimal across abroad set of modeling assumptions.

扫码加我 拉你入群

请注明：姓名-公司-职位

以便审核进群资格，未注明则拒绝

分享0 收藏1 回帖

感谢分享

fin-qq 发表于 2020-1-9 10:41
感谢分享

不客气！