Constitutional Rules, Informal Institutions and Agricultural Protection in ...

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英文文献：Constitutional Rules, Informal Institutions and Agricultural Protection in Developing and Industrial Countries: Theory and Empirical Evidence-发展中国家和工业国家的宪法规则、非正式制度与农业保护:理论与经验证据
英文文献作者：Abmann, Christian,Henning, Christian H.C.A.,Krampe, Eva
英文文献摘要：
This paper empirically investigates the interaction of formal and informal political institutions as well as lobbying in determining the ability of agriculture to avoid taxation or attract government transfers. Based on our theory we identify specific interaction effects between district size and characteristic political as well as demographic framework constellation, that determine two different regimes, e.g. an u-shape and an inverse u-shape relation between district size and the level of agricultural protection. Further, our theory implies specific different patterns of how these interaction effects impact on agricultural protection levels in developing and industrialized countries. Using time-series-cross-section (TSCS) data, this paper tackles the quantitative assessment of the theoretical implications. We estimate the latent regime of agricultural protection and assess the opposing quantitative relationships. We check our results for robustness concerning dynamic specification issues and latent heterogeneity. Furthermore we gauge the possible endogeneity of institutions via an extended treatment framework.

本文实证研究了正式和非正式政治制度以及游说在决定农业避税或吸引政府转移能力方面的相互作用。基于我们的理论，我们确定了区域规模与特征政治和人口结构星座之间的具体交互效应，这决定了两种不同的制度，例如，区域规模与农业保护水平之间的u形关系和反u形关系。此外，我们的理论暗示了这些相互作用如何影响发展中国家和工业化国家的农业保护水平的具体不同模式。利用时间序列-横截面(TSCS)数据，对理论意义进行定量评估。我们估计了农业保护的潜在制度，并评估了相反的数量关系。我们检查我们的结果关于动态规范问题的健壮性和潜在的异质性。此外，我们通过一个扩展的治疗框架来评估机构可能的内生性。

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