本文开发了一个模型来研究创新和出口许可中的寻租,并将其应用于越南大米出口。企业可以游说出口限制或自由贸易。创新是一种降低成本的技术。该分析着重于企业针对出口限制进行游说的创新激励措施,以及游说激励措施的决定因素。分析表明,游说出口限制的企业与自由贸易相比,在出口限制下采用技术创新的动机可能较低。当政治精英利用出口限制寻求租金时,这些发现可以帮助识别经济效率低下的情况。
AbstractThe paper develops a model to examine rent seeking in innovation and export licenses, with an application to Vietnam rice exports. Firms can lobby for export restrictions or for free trade. Innovation is introduced as a cost-reducing technology. The analysis focuses on the innovation incentives of the firm lobbying for export restrictions, and the determinants of lobbying incentives. The analysis shows that firms lobbying for export restrictions may have lower incentives to adopt technological innovations under export restrictions than under free trade. The findings can help to identify economic inefficiency when the political elites use export restrictions to seek rents.
EI2019-09.pdf
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