求助

是 否 +2 论坛币

k人 参与回答

经管之家送您一份

应届毕业生专属福利!

求职就业群

赵安豆老师微信：zhaoandou666

经管之家联合CDA

送您一个全额奖学金名额~ !

立即领取

感谢您参与论坛问题回答

经管之家送您两个论坛币！

+2 论坛币

那位朋友能提供这篇论文，在下不胜感激。Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts Pa. Grout 1984

扫码加我 拉你入群

请注明：姓名-公司-职位

以便审核进群资格，未注明则拒绝

分享0 收藏0 回帖

关键词：Investment Contracts investmen contract Binding Investment 不胜感激 朋友 论文

顶起来。。。。。。。。。。

INVESTMENT AND WAGES IN THE ABSENCE OF BINDING CONTRACTS: A NASH BARGAINING APPROACH
PAUL A GROUT. Econometrica (pre-1986). Evanston: Mar 1984. Vol. 52, Iss. 2; pg. 449, 12 pgs


Abstract (Summary)The paper uses a generalized Nash bargain to analyze input levels, profits, and wages in the absence of binding contracts, and compares these with the conventional binding contracts model. It is shown that if the union has any power, investment is lower in the absence of binding contracts. The associated input levels and shareholders' profits are identical to those that emerge if contracts are binding and the firm acts as if it faces a cost of capital which is a linear combination of the purchase price of capital and the resale value. This implicit cost is greater than the purchase price, is an increasing function of union power, and is independent of the profit function and the alternative wage. Increases in union power reduce shareholders' profits but may increase wages at some points and decrease wages at others. In the absence of binding contracts, shareholders' profits are lower but there is a critical level of union power (depending on the profit function) such that the union is worse off if its power is higher than this level and better off if it is lower.

3# lance0108 非常感谢您！